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Laws associated with issuing U.S. dollars cause dire poverty and
destroy the environment. American law has codified the dollar as suffi-
cient for satisfying debts even over a creditor’s objection (legal tender)
and as the only form of payment that typically meets federal tax obliga-
tions (functional currency). The Supreme Court has upheld govern-
ment bans on private possession of, or contractual repayment in,
monetary alternatives to the dollar like gold or silver. Furthermore,
since 1857 when the United States Congress began abandoning the sil-
ver standard in practice, the dollar has gradually been trending ever
greater as a “fiat money”—a debt instrument issued at the pleasure of
the sovereign—and, indeed, has been a 100% debt instrument since
1971 when the United States finally, formally, and completely aban-
doned gold and silver standards. States and municipalities also sup-
port these four legal aspects of the dollar despite a potentially contrary
constitutional mandate.
This Article examines implications of these four legally entrenched
aspects of the modern dollar—fiat money, legal tender, functional cur-
rency, and non-fiat money bans. As the first analysis in the academic
legal literature to do so, this Article demonstrates that the combination
of these four legal attributes leads to severe environmental damage and
catastrophic impoverishment of a portion of the global population (in
particular, those who are already abjectly poor). The Article shows that
calls for digital currencies based on international fiat monetary alter-
natives to the dollar, such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), will not
improve the environment and global economy and indeed may worsen
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them. The Article concludes by laying out possibilities for reform of
laws supporting the dollar in its present form that would diminish
both poverty and environmental destruction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article draws attention to how laws that accompany the mod-
ern U.S. dollar cause poverty and environmental destruction. In the
modern world, almost all currency is now fiat, meaning that (1) the
issuing government authority legally declares the currency to be
money and (2) its proclaimed value outstrips whatever the intrinsic
value the money content (metal, paper, or electronic, etc.) has. Promi-
nent economists frequently assume that government fiat money is a
helpful and good innovation.1 But less attention has been given to ad-
1. Paul Krugman, Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/opinion/transaction-
costs-and-tethers-why-im-a-crypto-skeptic.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9JBM-
VVXH] (“[F]iat currencies have underlying value because men with guns say they
do. And this means that their value isn’t a bubble that can collapse if people lose
faith.”); Paul Krugman, Bubble, Bubble, Fraud and Trouble, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/opinion/bitcoin-bubble-fraud.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/3AVR-2UVC] (“Although the modern dollar is a ‘fiat’ cur-
rency, not backed by any other asset, like gold, its value is ultimately backed by
the fact that . . . [i]ts purchasing power is [ ] stabilized by the Federal Reserve,
which will reduce the outstanding supply of dollars if inflation runs too high,
increase that supply to prevent deflation. And a $100 bill is, of course, worth 100
of these broadly stable dollars.”). See also JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THE-
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verse consequences of the coercive laws that ensure the public’s use of
the fiat currency.
In the first instance, one must draw a distinction between govern-
ment notes and government fiat money. The former does not employ
laws to coerce the public’s use of the money; it is merely one of many
debt instruments among those both public and private.2 Government
fiat, by contrast, is a lawfully anti-competitive currency. By legal de-
sign, it drives competing currencies out of the market, including gold
and silver.3 Some economists say that the legal enactments are neces-
sary to create marketplace efficiency in the use of money. Without a
uniform currency, the argument goes, transactions will be inefficient,
as trading parties have to determine what the relative exchange val-
ues of their competing monies are.4
Without denying possible efficiency benefits to a legally anti-com-
petitive currency, there are also oft-overlooked economic and environ-
mental harms. This Article draws attention specifically to two such
problems in Part II.5 First, the laws that accompany fiat money im-
poverish people. Many are effectively shut out of the economy while,
at the same time, they are paradoxically required to involuntarily par-
ticipate in the exchange of fiat money. Second, these laws damage the
environment. This is because the public must unsustainably over-ex-
tract resources to simultaneously try to stay financially solvent and
comply with the laws of fiat money.
There are three laws accompanying most modern fiat currencies
that cause poverty and environmental destruction. First are legal
ORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 353–58 and 370–71 (1936) (offering
support for fiat money systems).
2. See Lawrence H. White & William Luther, Positively Valued Fiat Money After the
Sovereign Disappears: The Case of Somalia, GMU Working Paper in Economics
No. 11–14 (Apr. 2, 2011) (reporting that the fiat Somali shilling retained positive
social trading value even after the collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991).
3. But see Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 659 (1870) (Field, J., dissenting) (“[I]f
we understand by currency the legal money of the country, and that which consti-
tutes a lawful tender for debts, and is the statue measure of value, then undoubt-
edly nothing is included but gold and silver . . . . This is a constitutional principle
perfectly plain, and of the very highest importance.”).
4. Irena Asmundson & Ceyda Oner, What is Money?, 49 FIN. & DEV. 52 (Sept. 2012)
(“[F]iat money is more efficient to use than precious metals.”).
5. Economists and legal scholars have discussed various other problems with fiat
money, such as loss of purchasing power, and “systemic solvency crises character-
ized by damaging asset price bubbles, unrepayable debt levels, an insolvent fi-
nancial system, hopelessly insolvent governments, and rising inflation.” Kevin
Dowd, Martin Hutchinson & Gordon Kerr, The Coming Fiat Money Cataclysm
and the Case for Gold, 32 CATO J. 363, 364–65 (2012). While not discounting
these considerably harmful possible adverse consequences, this Article focuses on
the implications for the poor and the environment, insomuch as these conse-
quences are of virtually universally accepted importance, normatively speaking,
and are often overlooked in regular commentary.
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tender laws. These laws require any creditor to accept payment in a
fiat currency from the debtor, even if the original contract called for
payment of equivalent value in some other form of currency or ex-
change. Second, governments providing fiat currencies often enact
non-fiat money bans, meaning it is illegal to possess or trade in cur-
rencies other than the exclusive government fiat currency. Third, gov-
ernment tax collection usually specifies that the fiat currency is the
only “functional currency” (i.e., form of currency) acceptable for paying
one’s taxes. Part I of this Article reviews the history of the American
adoption of these three types of laws.
Part II lays out a historical-theoretical framework to demonstrate
that these three kinds of laws when combined with a fiat currency
cause poverty and environmental destruction. Part II also discusses a
current trend away from global reliance on the dollar and towards an
international fiat currency.
Part III lays out four proposals for reform. First, legal tender laws
should be repealed and forbidden.6 Second, all non-fiat money bans,
except those regulating counterfeiting and fraud, should be repealed
and forbidden. Third, Congress should declare gold and silver in bar or
coin form as functional currencies for U.S. tax and tariff purposes. Fi-
nally, Congress should declare any asset that exceeds a certain mini-
mal threshold of common American monetary usage (say 66% of the
population) as a functional currency until that asset’s circulation de-
clines beneath the 66% threshold. Part III also considers the possible
need for redistributive justice to support those who have suffered
through over a century’s length of steady dollar devaluation and envi-
ronmental destruction.
II. A RELEVANT HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR’S LAWS
A. Fiat Money
The creation of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 allowed the
United States to operate as an independent national government for
the first time. Princeton University Library curators relate well the
manner in which the fledgling American government functioned mon-
etarily in the years up until the 1789 creation of the U.S. Constitution:
Although it had authorized the issue of medals and the creation of a national
seal in 1776, it wasn’t until 1786 that the Continental Congress passed an
6. See DANIEL WEBSTER, 4 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 271 (11th ed. 1854) (“[I]f
we understand by currency the legal money of the country, and that which consti-
tutes a legal tender for debts, and is the statute measure of value, then, undoubt-
edly, nothing is included but gold and silver. Most unquestionably there is no
legal tender . . . under the authority of this government or any other, but gold and
silver, either the coinage of our own mints or foreign coins at rates regulated by
Congress. This is a constitutional principle perfectly plain and of the highest
importance.”).
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ordinance to establish the coining regime for the new nation. In the meantime,
the prevailing legislation was the provision in the Articles of Confederation of
1777 that “the United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole
and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck
by their own authority, or by that of the respective states.” The result was a
monetary circulation that included old British coins, American and foreign
imitations of them, coins issued by various states, and paper money issued
both by the Congress and by individual states. There were also pattern pro-
posals for a national coinage created in England and in America.
. . . .
[A] proposal for a national coin, of unexpressed value, is known in silver,
copper, brass, and tin examples from a few die combinations. It was produced
by Elisha Gallaudet (ca. 1730–1779), an engraver in Freehold, New Jersey,
who made the cuts for the paper currency bearing these same motifs based on
drawings by Benjamin Franklin.
. . . .
Although [an] ordinance of 1786 called for the establishment of a mint, the
only national coinage actually issued under the Articles of Confederation was
a copper cent produced on contract by a private minter. It copied, with minor
changes, the 1775 proposal by Benjamin Franklin that had been used on pa-
per money and the “continental dollar patterns” of 1776.7
Several states, notably Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts, as well as private minters in New York, also issued
their own coinage during the Articles of Confederation era.8
With the creation of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, the codified
U.S. fiat money system emerged. Craig Elwell of the Congressional
Research Service very capably describes the history of fiat currency
creation in the United States beginning with the Coin Act of 1792:
The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith
and credit of the federal government. The currency is neither valued in,
backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its
history, however, the United States was on a metallic standard of one sort or
another.
. . . .
The United States began with a bimetallic standard in which the dollar
was defined in terms of both gold or silver at weights and fineness such that
gold and silver were set in value to each other at a ratio of 15 to 1. Because
world markets valued them at a 151/2 to 1 ratio, much of the gold left the coun-
try and silver was the de facto standard.
In 1834, the gold content of the dollar was reduced to make the ratio 16 to
1. As a result, silver left the country and gold became the de facto standard. In
addition, gold discoveries drove down the value of gold even more, so that even
small silver coins disappeared from circulation. In 1853, the silver content of
small coins was reduced below their official face value so that the public could
have the coins needed to make change.
During the Civil War, the government issued legal tender paper money
that was not redeemable in gold or silver, effectively placing the country on a
7. Princeton University Library, Coinage Under the Articles of Confederation, CAP-
PING LIBERTY: THE INVENTION OF NUMISMATIC ICONOGRAPHY FOR THE NEW AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, https://rbsc.princeton.edu/capping-liberty/case/4 [https://perma
.unl.edu/S8BV-FRWU].
8. Id.
2019] THE DOLLAR’S DEADLY LAWS 61
fiat paper system. In 1879, the country was returned to a metallic standard;
this time a single one: gold. Throughout the late 19th century, there were ef-
forts to remonetize silver. A quantity of silver money was issued; however, its
intrinsic value did not equal the face value of the money, nor was silver freely
convertible into money. In 1900, the United States reaffirmed its commitment
to the gold standard and relegated silver to small denomination money.
Throughout the period under which the United States had a metallic stan-
dard, paper money was extensively used. A variety of bank notes circulated,
even without being legal tender. Various notes issued by the Treasury also
circulated without being legal tender. This use of paper money is entirely con-
sistent with a gold standard. Much of the money used under a gold standard is
not gold, but promises to pay gold. To help ensure that the paper notes there-
tofore issued by banks were honored, the government created the national
bank system in 1863. In 1913, it created the Federal Reserve System to help
ensure that checks were similarly honored. The creation of the Federal Re-
serve did not end the gold standard.
The gold standard ended in 1933 when the federal government halted con-
vertibility of notes into gold and nationalized the private gold stock. The dol-
lar was devalued in terms of its gold content, and made convertible into gold
for official international transactions only. Even this quasi-gold standard be-
came difficult to maintain in the 1960s. Over the period 1967-1973, the United
States abandoned its commitment to covert dollars into gold in official trans-
actions and stopped trying to maintain its value relative to foreign exchange.
Despite several attempts to retain some link to gold, all official links of the
dollar to gold were severed in 1976.9
B. Legal Tender
The question of whether the government by law may force credi-
tors to accept payment by debtors in a currency designated by the gov-
ernment as such is as old as the American Republic. As early as 1702,
the colony of Massachusetts was issuing Bills of Credit to finance its
debts, and other colonies followed suit throughout the 1700s.10 How-
ever, the British Parliament in January 1751 issued a proclamation
that “no paper currency, or bills of credit of any kind issued in any of
the said colonies or plantations, shall be a legal tender in payment of
any private dues whatsoever within any of them.”11
“Continental” bills—national paper currency issued during the exi-
gency of the Revolutionary War—
[W]ere not made legal tenders at first, but in January, 1777, the Congress
passed resolutions declaring that they ought to pass current in all payments,
and be deemed in value equal to the same nominal sums in Spanish dollars,
and that any one refusing so to receive them ought to be deemed an enemy to
the liberties of the United States.12
9. Craig K. Elwell, Brief History of the Gold Standard in the United States, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (June 23, 2011).
10. GEORGE BANCROFT, A PLEA FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. OF AMERICA
WOUNDED IN THE HOUSE OF ITS GUARDIANS 10–11 (1886).
11. Id. at 22.
12. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 558 (1870) (Bradley, J., concurring) (citing 3
JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 19–20 (1775)).
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However, as one 19th century Supreme Court justice noted, “the
[paper money] scheme failed and the bills became, during 1780, of so
little value that they ceased to circulate and ‘quietly died,’ . . . ‘in the
hands of their possessors.’”13
Because of this prior experience with Continentals, most of the
American founding fathers recognized dangers of the paper currencies
and bills of credit that the colonies/states and the fledgling US govern-
ment had issued before, during, and after the War of Independence. In
the United States’ original compact—the Articles of Confederation—
there was no mention of legal tender. Later, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, in a judicial interpretation of those Articles, held that “Congress
emitted bills of credit to a large amount, and did not, perhaps could
not, make them a legal tender. This power resided in the states.”14 On
August 1, 1786, George Washington wrote to Thomas Jefferson:
“Other states are falling into very foolish and wicked plans of emitting
paper money.”15 Later that year, in the Virginia House of Delegates,
James Madison observed:
Paper money is unjust; to creditors, if a legal tender; to debtors, if not legal
tender, by increasing the difficulty of getting specie. It is unconstitutional, for
it affects the rights of property as much as taking away equal value in land. It
is pernicious, destroying confidence between individuals; discouraging com-
merce; enriching sharpers; vitiating morals; reversing the end of government;
and conspiring with the examples of other states to disgrace republican gov-
ernments in the eyes of mankind.16
The question of whether Congress would be empowered to issue a
currency carrying legal tender status apparently came to a head dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention. In Article I, Section 5, Clause 8,
the Founders drafted a statement that “[t]he legislature of the United
States shall have the power to borrow money and emit bills on the
credit of the United States.” The journal of the convention for August
16, 1787 made this record: “It was moved and seconded to strike out
the words ‘and emit bills,’ ” and the motion to strike out these words
“passed in the affirmative. Yeas: New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia—9. Nays: New Jersey, Maryland—2.”17 Thus
the convention, by a vote of more than four to one, refused to grant to
the legislature of the United States the power “to emit bills on the
credit of the United States.” In interpreting this event, Madison left
this note: “Striking out the words cut off the pretext for a paper cur-
13. Id. at 646 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing 2 PITKIN’S HISTORY 157).
14. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410, 435 (1830).
15. Bancroft, supra note 10, at 36.
16. Id. at 36–37.
17. Id. at 44–45.
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rency, and particularly for making the bills a tender either for public
or private debts.”18
In 1792, Congress established by the Coinage Act19 a U.S. mint
and established and defined by law the U.S. dollar to be 371 1/4 grains
of fine Spanish-milled silver.20 The first U.S. dollar minted was the
silver Flowing Hair dollar in 1795.
The Silver Flowing Hair Dollar
Image courtesy of the National Numismatic Collection,
National Museum of American History
It has been the subject of much discussion—from the 19th Century
to present—as to what the Founders collectively intended with respect
to federal legal tender laws when they drafted the Constitution.21
18. Id. at 45. A discounting view of Madison’s contrary comment was given by an
1888 legal commentator who stated, “[Madison] does not give us the course of
argument by which he arrived at this [conclusion]. Nor does he give us any clue
as to whether the other members of the convention agreed with him. In a word, it
is a purely private opinion of Mr. Madison which events have proved to be wrong.
This is not the first time that an individual, in drawing a public document, think-
ing that he had included and excluded certain things, found out afterwards, when
the instrument came up for adjudication, that he had made a mistake.” Edmund
J. James, Some Considerations on the Legal-Tender Decisions, 3 PUB. AM. ECON.
ASS’N. 49, 66 (1888).
19. Act of April 2, 1792 (Coinage Act), 1 Stat. 246 (1792).
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21. Compare Webster, supra note 6, and Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 451
(1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (“If there be anything in the history of the constitu-
tion which can be established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that
instrument intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes by both the gen-
eral government and by the states, and thus prevent interference with the con-
tracts of private parties.”) with id. at 443–45, 447–48, 450 (majority opinion)
(concluding that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit federal legal tender, that
there is a “danger in giving too much weight, upon such a question to the debates
and the votes in the [Constitutional] convention,” and that whether it is “wise
and expedient to resort to [legal tender] is a political question, to be determined
by congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to
be afterwards passed upon by the courts.”). Cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122, 206 (1819) (“The attention of the [Constitutional] convention,
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Whatever may have been their intent, the United States government
issued paper notes throughout the 19th Century,22 but gold and silver
were considered legal tender until 1873.23 In 1819, the U.S. Supreme
Court proclaimed in the landmark case McCulloch v. Maryland24 that,
not only was a national bank constitutional, but states could not tax
the federal government notes issued by that bank. Further, states
were not permitted to issue their own notes much longer after McCul-
loch. In the 1830 case Craig v. Missouri,25 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that states could not issue their own bills of credit to debt-bur-
dened farmers because the certificates were unconstitutional under
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which dictates that states can
only make gold or silver a legal tender. Thus, it remained somewhat of
an unanswered question as to whether a national currency could be
legal tender, but state currencies were specifically excluded. By 1869,
therefore, was particularly directed to paper money and to acts which enable the
debtor to discharge his debt otherwise than was stipulated in the contract . . . .
The convention appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that con-
tracts should be inviolable.”). One modern constitutional originalist, Robert
Natelson, after an extensive canvassing of the Founders’ writings and discus-
sions, concludes that:
According to the original understanding, the Constitution’s Coinage
Clause granted to Congress the express power to coin money and bestow
legal tender quality upon that money. A similar power of lesser, but still
broad, scope was also created by the Commerce Clause, for part of the
eighteenth-century definition of ‘regulating commerce’ was the issuance
and regulation of the media of exchange.
In addition, the money thus ‘coined’ did not need to be metallic. Paper
or any other material that Congress selected would suffice.
Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage
Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1079 (2008).
22. See Elwell, supra note 9, at 4 (“Throughout the period before the Civil War, there
was no legal-tender paper money in the United States. Yet a variety of paper
money existed and circulated as readily as coin. These included private bank
notes, some Treasury notes, and (in large transactions) financial instruments
called bills of exchange. In each case, these paper claims were promises to pay
gold or silver.”).
23. Gold and silver were legal tender from 1793 until 1873:
From 1792 to 1873 both the gold and silver dollar were standard and
legal tender, coinage was free and unlimited. Persistent efforts were
made to keep both in circulation. Because the prescribed relation be-
tween them got out of harmony with exchange values, the gold coin dis-
appeared, and did not in fact freely circulate in this country for 30 years
prior to 1834. During that time business transactions were based on sil-
ver. In 1834, desiring to restore parity and bring gold back into circula-
tion, Congress reduced somewhat (6 per cent.) the weight of the gold coin
and thus equalized the coinage and the exchange values. The silver dol-
lar was not changed. The purpose was to restore the use of gold as cur-
rency—not to force up prices or destroy obligations.
Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
24. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
25. 29 U.S. 410 (1830).
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the federal government was permitted to tax state-issued notes, thus
ensuring the demise of state banks.26 As a nineteenth century legal
commentator concluded, Article I, Section 10 “in effect took from the
states all the power over the subjects, both of making money and de-
claring legal tender.”27
The major development regarding the constitutionality of the dol-
lar’s legal tender status came during and after the Civil War. In an
effort to finance Union troops, Lincoln and Congress issued millions of
dollars in “greenbacks” paper notes starting in 1862. The notes circu-
lated widely during and after the War, and ultimately, the question
came to the fore whether the notes had to be accepted as legal tender,
particularly for private debts. One legal commentator observed in
1869 that initially during the Civil War, the support of legal tender
was patriotic, and it was only after the war’s conclusion, and after
some reflection, that people began to question its validity.28
In 1869, the Supreme Court in Hepburn v. Griswold constitution-
ally rejected Congress’s issuance of a legal tender paper money during
the Civil War.29 Griswold was a pitched-battle 5–3 decision. Although
the holding and dissent centered largely on whether the Constitution’s
Necessary and Proper Clause permitted Congress to create legal
tender paper currency,30 both sets of justices also drew attention to
the economic implications of legal tender. Chief Justice Salmon Chase
opined that legal tender laws contribute to grisly effects:
[T]here is abundant evidence, that whatever benefit is possible from that com-
pulsion to some individuals or to the government, is far more than outweighed
by the losses of property, the derangement of business, the fluctuations of cur-
rency and values, and the increase of prices to the people and the government,
and the long train of evils which flow from the use of irredeemable paper
money. It is true that these evils are not to be attributed altogether to making
it a legal tender. But this increases these evils. It certainly widens their ex-
tent and protracts their continuance.31
By contrast, dissenting Justice Miller, without denying the poten-
tial harms of legal tender, described the promulgation of greenbacks
and the assignment of legal tender status to them as a kind of histori-
26. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 556 (1869) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
burden of the tax . . . has proved fatal to those [banks] of the States; and, if we are
at liberty to judge of the purpose of an act, from the consequences that have fol-
lowed, it is not, perhaps, going too far to say, that these consequences were
intended.”).
27. I.F.R., Legal Tender Notes Before the Supreme Court, 17 AM. L. REGISTER 193,
200 (1869).
28. See id. at 193.
29. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
30. Id. at 625.
31. Id. at 621.
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cally inevitable evil during the Civil War to overcome a very real pos-
sibility of total economic collapse of the Union itself.32
However, with the addition of two new justices and the retirement
of one within a year, the Court in a series of cases between 1871 and
1884 decisively reversed Griswold, holding with finality that it was
constitutionally proper for Congress to issue legal tender paper
money, not only in wartime exigency,33 but also in peacetimes, as held
in the conclusive 1884 eight-to-one decision, Julliard v. Greenman.34
One commentator in 1888 observed the judicial pattern that:
In both the former cases [since 1871] the court was evidently influenced, to a
large extent, by what it supposed would be the economical evils of a contrary
decision. In [Julliard v. Greenman] the court refused to ask itself the question
whether the issue of legal-tender notes is or is not, economically speaking, a
32. Justice Miller wrote:
All the ordinary means of rendering efficient the several powers of Con-
gress . . . had been employed to their utmost capacity, and with the spirit
of the rebellion unbroken, with large armies in the field unpaid, with a
current expenditure of over a million of dollars per day, the credit of the
government nearly exhausted, and the resources of taxation inadequate
to pay even the interest on the public debt, Congress was called on to
devise some new means of borrowing money on the credit of the nation;
for the result of the war was conceded by all thoughtful men to depend
on the capacity of the government to raise money in amounts previously
unknown. The banks had already loaned their means to the treasury.
They had been compelled to suspend the payment of specie on their own
notes. The coin in the country, if it could all have been placed within the
control of the Secretary of the Treasury, would not have made a circula-
tion sufficient to answer army purchases and army payments, to say
nothing of the ordinary business of the country. A general collapse of
credit, of payment, and of business seemed inevitable, in which faith in
the ability of the government would have been destroyed, the rebellion
would have triumphed, the States would have been left divided, and the
people impoverished. The National government would have perished,
and, with it, the Constitution which we are now called upon to construe
with such nice and critical accuracy.
Id. at 632–33 (Miller, J., dissenting).
33. Professor Natelson documents the seminal Supreme Court cases between 1871
and 1884:
Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (compan-
ion cases that together are known as the Legal Tender cases) (overruling
Hepburn and holding, 5–4, that Congress could make Civil War paper
money legal tender for debts arising both before and after the legal
tender enactment); Dooley v. Smith, 80 U.S. 604 (1871) (upholding, 6–3,
a tender law covering paper money, relying on the Legal Tender Cases);
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 82 U.S. 195 (1872) (upholding a legal tender
law, 6–3); Maryland v. Railroad Co., 89 U.S. 105 (1874) (holding, 7–2,
that to sustain a contractual requirement that a debt be paid only in gold
there must be a specific term in the contract to that effect); Juilliard v.
Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884) (holding, 8–1, that Congress had author-
ity to enact peacetime tender law covering reissued greenbacks).
Natelson, supra note 21, at 1019 n.3.
34. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
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good or bad thing, and confined itself simply to the question whether Congress
had the power or not.35
Although gold and silver continued to function as forms of legal
tender in the decades after the original legal tender cases, later cases
(see section II.C) and legislative acts by Congress led to today’s pre-
sent circumstances, in which only Federal reserve notes, and circulat-
ing notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banks, not gold and
silver, are decreed as legal tender.36 Thus, the displacement has come
full circle: what originally was the case that only gold and silver were
legal tender has now become the opposite—only paper dollars are.
C. Gold and Silver Bans
During the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1933 issued an executive order37 requiring citizens to surrender phys-
ical gold, gold certificates, or gold bonds to the federal government in
exchange for paper dollars at the rate of $20.67:1.38 Also, by presiden-
tial proclamation, “hoarding” of gold or silver coin, bullion, or currency
was prohibited with criminal penalties for noncompliance.39 A year
later, in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Congress set into law FDR’s
executive order from the year prior and, simultaneously, formally de-
valued the dollar relative to gold from $20.67:1 to $35:1.40 In 1934, the
passage of the Silver Purchase Act41 and an accompanying Executive
Order by Roosevelt42 required surrender of privately held silver in ex-
change for government-issued silver certificates. Also, in 1935, Con-
gress passed the Banking Act of 1935, which vested full control of the
United States’ monetary supply (of paper dollar notes) in the Federal
Reserve Bank’s Open Market Committee (FOMC).43
In addition to the restrictions on gold and silver trading and pos-
session, Congress in 1933 passed a Joint Resolution nullifying public
and private contract “gold clauses” (i.e., contractual clauses that allow
the creditor to expect and receive payment in gold).44 At the time,
35. James, supra note 18, at 56.
36. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018).
37. Exec. Order No. 6102 (1933). Individuals were allowed to retain up to 5 troy
ounces of gold bullion coins per household. Id.
38. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 462, 463 (1936).
39. Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (March 6, 1933).
40. An Act to protect the currency system of the United States, to provide for the
better use of the monetary gold stock of the United States, and for other pur-
poses. ch. 6, 48 Stat. 337 (1934).
41. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No 438 (allowing for Treasury Department issue of
silver certificates in exchange for surrendered silver).
42. Exec. Order No. 6814 (1934).
43. An Act to provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to
regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into specula-
tive operations, and for other purposes, ch. 6, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
44. Ch. 48, 48 Stat. 113 (1933).
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about 43% of outstanding debt in the United States was based on a
gold clause, including “virtually all federal obligations, the bonds of
the federal and joint stock land banks, most of the corporate funded
debt, except that of certain real estate mortgage companies, and about
one-half of the state and municipal debt.”45
Subsequent legal challenges to this Joint Resolution came before
the U.S. Supreme Court in three cases in 1935: Perry v. United
States46 (nullification of gold clauses in federal bonds), Norman v. Bal-
timore and Ohio Railroad Company47 (nullification of gold clauses in
private contracts), and Nortz v. United States48 (whether someone re-
deeming a gold certificate was entitled to the international market
price or instead the newly devalued federal government price). After
oral argument in the three cases, President Roosevelt was concerned
that the Court might strike down the 1933 Gold Clause Joint Resolu-
tion, and in an “unprecedented statement” publicly threatened to ig-
nore the Court’s decisions if they did so.49
A recent article contends that the Gold Clause justices were torn
between doubting the Joint Resolution’s constitutionality and main-
taining legal pragmatism about a very real recalcitrant Presidential
threat to the Court’s powers.50 The justices, in three five-to-four deci-
sions all announced on the same day, therefore accepted the govern-
ment’s positions that nullification was a constitutional “necessity” in
light of the Great Depression.51
The government’s successful argument before the Court in these
cases was formally based on an interpretation of the Legal Tender
cases from the 1870s and 1880s. Angus MacLean, the Assistant Solici-
tor General who prepared the Gold Clause cases for the government,
asserted that Congress’s power
[I]n money matters was not only plenary, by virtue of the Constitution, but
inherent, and this led to the taking by us of the advanced position that power
over coinage and currency is an attribute of sovereignty . . . What has been
decided [by the Gold Clause Cases] is that in a conflict between the obligation
of private contracts and the power of Congress over the monetary system of
the country, the private right must give way to public policy.52
45. Richard M. Boeckel, Invalidation of the Gold Clause, 1 EDIT. RES. REPS. (1933).
46. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
47. 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
48. 294 U.S. 317 (1935).
49. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2012).
50. Id., passim. Accord Note, Some Aspects of the Nullification of Gold Clauses in
Obligations, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 138, 144 (1934) (“[T]he power to nullify the gold
clause is necessary to the effective exercise of the monetary powers of Congress.”).
51. Magliocca, supra note 49, at 1243.
52. Angus D. MacLean, Outline of the Gold Clause Cases, 15 N.C. L. REV. 249, 252,
254 (1937). See also John Hanna, Federal Currency Restrictions and Gold Con-
tracts, 19 AM. BAR ASSOC. J. 349, 351 (1933) (“It is for the legislature, not the
courts, to determine which substances, and of what weight, quality or form, shall
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The three aforementioned laws and the Gold Clause Cases had a
joint effect of removing the country de facto from a gold currency stan-
dard,53 and instead putting the United States on an inflationary54
Federal Reserve note standard.55 It was not until 1964 when gold cer-
tificates could again be bought and sold by private investors (but were
still not redeemable in Treasury gold),56 and 1974 when citizens could
again trade and own gold.57 (Up until the 1960s, the government per-
mitted silver certificates and silver bills to be issued and required the
Treasury to have on hand sufficient funds to pay back those bills at a
rate of $1.292 per bill or less.58 Congress in 1963 legislated that silver
certificates were no longer to be backed by Treasury guarantees.59)
While the Gold Clause Cases and seizures of gold and silver were
justified as a national exigency in strikingly similar fashion to the con-
pass current as money. It is one of the attributes of sovereignty to determine the
relationship of the various forms of money, and when it is done the courts of law
as well as individual citizens must conform to the change and regard as a dollar
that which Congress declares to be so.”).
53. As some economists note, “[e]ither a gold standard specifies the quantity of
money in the economy, or a central bank does. A marriage of the two never lasts
longer than an unhappy weekend.” Mark Thornton, Richard H. Timberlake, Jr. &
Thomas J. Thompson, Gold Policy in the 1930s, INDEP. INST. RES. ARTICLE (May 1,
1999), http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=165 [https://perma
.unl.edu/RM2M-VXV6].
54. At the time, some commentators worried that this policy by the federal govern-
ment would create precedent for a perpetual cycle of inflation, particularly during
times of depression, that would be harmful to the economy. Indeed, the subse-
quent 85 years have borne out as true their worries. As one Columbia University
economist put the proposition,
To put it in a word, therefore, the devaluation, currency inflation and
“commodity dollar” measures have very largely failed to achieve, to date,
the objectives at which they were aimed. In addition, I fear that they
have created grave inflationary dangers for the future, for they will
make it harder than ever to control those over-expansions in which de-
pressions like the one we have just been experiencing always originate. I
shall consider presently the possible defense for certain types of infla-
tion, when inflation is regarded as a necessary means for financing the
tremendous costs of the recovery and the New Deal programs. But even
from this point of view, I think that the currency experiments cannot be
justified. It would have been better on all counts if they had never been
attempted.
James W. Angell, Gold, Banks and the New Deal, 49 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 494 (1934).
55. It is true that President Richard Nixon dealt the final nail in the coffin of gold as
a monetary standard in 1971, when he declared that even international exchange
of dollars for U.S.-held gold would no longer be allowed. See Exec. Order No.
11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (Aug. 17, 1971). But the majority of the U.S. shift away
from gold as a monetary standard occurred on President Franklin Roosevelt’s
watch.
56. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, title I, § 3, 48 Stat. 2; 12 U.S.C. § 248(n) (1964).
57. Act of Aug. 14, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-373, § 2, 88 Stat. 445 (repealing 31 U.S.C.
§ 443 (1976)).
58. See 31 U.S.C. § 405a-1 (1965).
59. Act of June 4, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-36, 77 Stat. 54 (1963).
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troversial Legal Tender Cases a half-century earlier,60 many people—
even professional economists—were displeased by the bans on posses-
sion of non-fiat money, declaring those governmental actions disas-
trously inflationary and outright immoral.61
D. Functional Currency
The concept of a functional currency is that a government may, at
its sole discretion, establish in what forms of money or assets taxes
may be paid. For instance, at various historical times, the ancient Is-
raelites,62 the Chinese (even peasants),63 and Arab-Sasanians64 were
obligated to pay taxes and tributes only in silver.
In Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations and under U.S. law,
the U.S. Federal Reserve Note dollar is the functional currency unit of
tax collection.65 After President Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from
60. Economics professor Richard Timberlake argues that the Gold Clause Case jus-
tices had a unique opportunity to revisit the Legal Tender Cases and Juilliard v.
Greeman and overturn those holdings, and by failing to do so, wrecked the Ameri-
can monetary system embedded in the Constitution. Richard H. Timberlake,
From Constitutional to Fiat Money: The U.S. Experience, 32 CATO J. 349, 361–62
(2012).
61. See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 408, 419 (1935) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting) (“Loss of reputation for honorable dealing will bring us unending hu-
miliation; the impending legal and moral chaos [from these Gold Clause deci-
sions] is appalling.”). Then-renowned Columbia University economics professor
James W. Angell wrote shortly after the Gold Clause Cases were decided:
What the Roosevelt program on gold, silver and paper money has thus
far meant is hence roughly as follows. The gold dollar has been devalued
to 59 per cent of its former gold worth; it has been tentatively stabilized,
but only within maximum limits that are 20 per cent apart; it has been
made, at least potentially, a bimetallic dollar of uncertain content and
value, instead of merely a devalued gold dollar; gold and silver have been
“nationalized”; very large silver purchases have been prescribed; and the
issue of several kinds of paper money has been liberalized. These mea-
sures are all aimed, of course, at inflation, and at inflation of a particular
kind: currency inflation. I have already indicated that I do not think the
abandonment of the gold standard was technically necessary at the time
it took place. In addition, I think that on a strict view the devaluation of
the dollar and the abrogation of the gold clause were completely
immoral.
Angell, supra note 54, at 492.
62. Exodus 30:13.
63. NING MA, THE AGE OF SILVER: THE RISE OF THE NOVEL EAST AND WEST 58 (2016).
64. Jonathan Karam Skaff, Sasanian and Arab-Sasanian Silver Coins from Turfan:
Their Relationship to International Trade and the Local Economy, 11 ASIA MAJOR
67, 98 (1998).
65. Internal Revenue Service, Foreign Currency and Currency Exchange Rates (May
2, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/foreign-curren
cy-and-currency-exchange-rates [https://perma.unl.edu/TF47-GBP3]. The regula-
tions state:
Payments of U.S. tax must be remitted to the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) in U.S. dollars . . . The U.S. dollar is the functional currency
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its last remaining vestiges of the international gold standard in 1971,
a large number of cases were brought in the 1970s and 1980s chal-
lenging Federal Reserve fiat paper dollars as unconstitutional forms
of functional currency.66 Other lawsuits during the same era sought
holdings that state and municipal governments could only accept tax
payments in gold or silver.67 Neither of these categories of lawsuits
proved successful. Similarly, attempts to pay taxes or other govern-
ment fees by “public office money certificates,” which are “a promise to
pay when an official determination is made as to what type of cur-
for all taxpayers except some qualified business units (QBUs) . . . Even if
you have a QBU, your functional currency is the dollar if any of the fol-
lowing apply: you conduct the business in dollars; the principal place of
business is located in the United States; you choose to or are required to
use the dollar as your functional currency; the business books and
records are not kept in the currency of the economic environment in
which a significant part of the business activities is conducted).
Id.
66. United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
967 (1977); United States v. Moon, 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d
118 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977); United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953
(9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Milam v. United States, 524
F.2d 629 (9th Cir.1974); United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir.1979); Herald v. State, 691 P.2d
1255 (Id. Ct. App. 1984); Rush v. Casco Bank & Tr. Co., 348 A.2d 237 (Me. 1975);
Allnutt v. State, 478 A.2d 321 (Md. 1984); Chermack v. Bjornson, 223 N.W.2d 659
(Minn. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 915 (1975); Middlebrook v. Mississippi State
Tax Comm’n, 387 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1980); State v. Gasser, 306 N.W.2d 205 (N.D.
1981); Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1978); First Nat’l Bank of Black
Hills v. Treadway, 339 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1983); City of Colton v. Corbly, 323
N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1982); Leitch v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 519 P.2d 1045 (Or. Ct.
App. 1974); Rothacker v. Rockwall Cty. Cent. Appraisal Dist., 703 S.W.2d 235
(Tx. App. 1985); Kauffman v. Citizens State Bank of Loyal, 307 N.W.2d 325 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1981).
67. Radue v. Zanaty, 308 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1975) (tax check payment had memo line
demanding government redemption in gold or silver); Cohn v. Tucson Elec. Power
Co., 673 P.2d 334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (public utility terminated electrical service
to customer who refused to pay tax portion of bill in anything other than gold or
silver); Spurgeon v. Franchise Tax Bd., 160 Cal. App. 3d 524 (1984) (attempt to
reclaim purported overpayment of taxes based on declining purchasing power of
U.S. fiat dollar); Allen v. Craig, 564 P.2d 552 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (attempt to pay
taxes in silver dollars); People v. Lawrence, 333 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(attempt to pay traffic fine in gold or silver); Richardson v. Richardson, 332
N.W.2d 524, 534 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (attempt to pay state-compelled child sup-
port in gold or silver); Trohimovich v. Dir. of Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 584 P.2d
467 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (attempt to pay government industrial insurance pre-
mium via a formula differentiating the values between “statutory dollars” com-
puted from the daily gold price on the London exchange and “paper dollars” as
issued by the Federal Reserve).
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rency has been authorized as a substitution for gold and silver,”68
were deemed “frivolous” and invalid.69 Thus, the conclusion of modern
American case law is that Federal Reserve dollars are functional cur-
rency, and gold and silver are not.
E. States and Municipalities
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution requires that “[n]o
State shall . . . make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts.” A simple textual reading might give the inference
that states, subordinate divisions of states, and municipal govern-
ments cannot deal in a money or currency other than gold or silver
coins. At least one state supreme court in the 1800s had this under-
standing.70 But the Legal Tender Cases’ holdings that Congress has a
plenary power over both the issuance of domestic currency and any
currency’s legal tender status removed this possible interpretation of
the constitutional clause. Instead, the judicially preferred interpreta-
tion is as one state supreme court held in 1989:
Article 1, section 10, clause 1 applies only to the states: It “is intended to pre-
vent states from creating new forms of legal tender not recognized or author-
ized by the federal government.” The clause is not a directive to the states to
deal only in gold or silver coin; rather, it is simply a restriction on states es-
tablishing any legal tender other than gold or silver coins. More important,
section 10 does not apply to the federal government.71
III. ECONOMIC INSIGHTS INTO THE DOLLAR’S
LEGAL ATTRIBUTES
“Some people are so poor and hungry that God only appears to them as a silver
coin in a fish’s mouth.”
—Christopher Guzelian, adapted from a saying by Mahatma Gandhi
Earth has limited resources and does not yield those resources
readily. Consequently, humans must work to live. But self-seeking
mankind prefers the leisure of paradise to work, despite the impossi-
bility of collective paradisiac leisure given the scarcity of resources. As
68. Parsons v. State, 745 P.2d 300, 307, n.1 (Id. Ct. App. 1987).
69. Id. at 307. See Pyne v. Meese, 172 Cal. App. 3d 392 (1985); Becker v. Dep’t of
Registration and Educ., 513 N.E.2d 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Dack v. State, 457
N.E.2d 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Niles v. Trawick, 512 A.2d 808 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986).
70. State v. Beackmo, 8 Blackf. 246, 250–51 (Ind. 1846) (holding that a state statute
allowing for just compensation for property takings cannot operate unless pay-
ment is made in gold or silver).
71. Baird v. Cty. Assessors of Salt Lake & Utah Ctys., 779 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1989)
(citing Spurgeon, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 529). Other modern state courts have simi-
larly rejected facial textual readings of Article I, Section 10. See, e.g., Berry v.
Hannigan, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Cal. App. 1992); Walton v. Keim, 694 P.2d 1287
(Co. App. 1984); Chermack v. Bjornson, 223 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1974).
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this section will demonstrate, the creation of a fiat money, along with
legal enactments of legal tender (forcing creditors to take the fiat cur-
rency as settlement of a debt), functional currency status for fiat cur-
rencies (forcing taxpayers to pay the fiat currency as the only valid
settlement of government tax debts), and prohibitions on possession of
non-fiat monetary instruments like gold and silver enable its creator
(a sovereign) to enjoy leisure relative to fellow mankind. For that rea-
son, the temptation for sovereigns to create strong fiat currency al-
ways has existed.72 It is no less so the case for the modern dollar.
As this section will also discuss, fiat money after its creation does
not circulate evenly in society, but rather follows a path through soci-
ety, starting with the sovereign and the sovereign’s preferred patrons.
Eventually the fiat money, through legal powers given it by concur-
rent mandates of legal tender, functional currency, and bans on non-
fiat money, winds its way to the “fiat poor”—persons who cannot bene-
fit from the fiat money to acquire the resources they could have other-
wise, but who are nonetheless compelled by law to acquire and spend
it. Those fiat poor compulsorily acquire the fiat currency to the detri-
ment of the environment and to their dire impoverishment past the
point of subsistence.
These economic phenomena resulting from fiat currency and le-
gally accompanying mandates are neither unique to the dollar nor
new. The fiat poor problem that results from fiat currency was known
to the ancients. As related in a curious story in the New Testament’s
Gospel of Matthew, Jesus Christ of Nazareth saved a fiat poor (Saint
Peter, a destitute fisherman) by a miracle of producing a silver coin in
a fish’s mouth that offset the combined harmful effects on Peter of fiat
money and functional currency. The fact that it required a miracle of
God to unwind the problems that laws related to fiat money had cre-
72. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (40th anniversary ed. 2009).
Friedman writes:
Historically, the device that has evolved most frequently in many differ-
ent places and over the course of centuries is a commodity standard; i.e.,
the use as money of some physical commodity such as gold or silver . . . If
money consisted wholly of a physical commodity of this type, there would
be, in principle, no need for control by the government at all . . . The
fundamental defect of a commodity standard, from the point of view of
the society as a whole, is that it requires the use of real resources to add
to the stock of money. People must work hard to dig gold out of the
ground in South Africa—in order to rebury it in Fort Knox or some simi-
lar place. The necessity of using real resources for the operation of a
commodity standard establishes a strong incentive for people to find
ways to achieve the same results without employing these resources. If
people will accept as money pieces of paper on which is printed ‘I prom-
ise to pay —— units of the commodity standard,’ these pieces of paper
can perform the same function as the physical pieces of gold or silver,
and they require very much less resources to produce.
Id. at 40.
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ated goes to show the extent of harm that such laws can create for fiat
poor and the environment.
To demonstrate fiat money’s harms when combined with certain
concurrent legal mandates (i.e., legal tender and functional currency
mandates and non-fiat money bans), this section invokes a thought
experiment to show that the leisure that some people achieve via fiat
currency imperils others’ lives, the environment, and the economy’s
general sophistication. The thought experiment also demonstrates
that, under any system of fiat money with the three concurrent legal
mandates, the subjective theory of value invoked by so many modern
economists is rendered (1) incomplete and (2) amoral and tolerant of
criminal and self-harming behavior that are likely to occur in a society
governed through fiat money. Said differently, rote approval of the
subjective value theory in a legally supported fiat monetary system
leads to unavoidable conclusions that: (1) there will be some people
(fiat poor) who lack sufficient material resources to trade (and there-
fore the subjective value theory, which is predicated upon exchanges,
is not a universally applicable theory of value wherever fiat monetary
systems exist); and (2) fiat poor’s suicides, migrations, or transforma-
tions to outlaws are probable in a fiat system (and subjective value
theory is agnostic as to the morality of these outcomes, meaning that
economists typically will not bother to mount an ethical protest
against fiat systems).73
A. The Fiat Money Thought Experiment, Part 1: From Raw
Silver to Fiat Silver
We will now perform a thought experiment informed by historical
events. What we will show is that when combined, fiat money, legal
tender, functional currency, and non-fiat money bans act in concert to
coercively create unavoidable shut-out of some direly poor human be-
ings (fiat poor) from the economy, while simultaneously demanding
their participation in it. Furthermore, these laws related to fiat money
promote environmental destruction as fiat poor make a last-ditch ef-
73. The discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, but the limitations to the sub-
jective theory of value that are witnessed when a fiat money system is introduced
proves that a more comprehensive moral economic theory of value is needed to
describe the optimal economy. Such a theory does not entirely displace the sub-
jective theory of value, but compels subjectivists to acknowledge that their theory
is incomplete and immoral if it stands on its own, and that God provides the
deficit economic value (where value is judged in God’s eyes, not men’s) to com-
plete the functional economy among selfish men. Thus, any theory of value must
account not just for men’s valuation of things, but for God’s surpassing valuation
of man and environment, and His ability to rearrange distribution of resources
supernaturally to ensure all men’s continued survival and the continued health of
the world.
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fort at survival under an extraordinarily burdensome financial
system.
Let us imagine an ancient, original economy that has (only) three
products: silver, barley, and fish. Silver is used only as money (an in-
termediate good)—a measure of account (numeraire) that serves as a
trade denominator to avoid the need for barter in exchange for fish,
barley, or both.74
In the economy, everyone except the sovereign works either as a
silver miner, barley farmer, or fisherman. Everyone must eat to live,
and could eat barley, fish, or both, to sustain themselves. Resources
are scarce75 but sustainable if used judiciously.
In an economy where there is specialization and differentiation of
labor, trade becomes necessary. As such, there needs to be a numerical
account of these products’ relative values. Often these are referred to
as exchange values or even prices, but in discussing the relative val-
ues of silver, barley, and fish, ancient peoples referred not to prices of
products but to exchange weights. To modern minds, it is somewhat
strange to think of money (in this case silver) in terms of a relative
physical weight (e.g. a gram), but historically this was the case.76
In light of this, members of society would need established relative
weights (values) of products for trading purposes. Let us say that in
the beginning, the following ratios existed: 1 gram of silver is equal to
1 bushel of barley, and 1 gram of silver is worth 2 fish. This would
establish a relative weight ratio table, enabling sales (involving silver)
and barter (between fish and barley), as follows:
Table 1
Relative Weight Ratios with Silver Grams
as Money (Denominator)
Silver (grams) Barley Bushel Fish
Silver (grams) 1:1 1:1 1:2
Three important ontological questions about history follow from
the weight table: First, who established these progenitor weights?;
Second, why were the original ratios what they were?; Third, can and
should those ratios have changed?
74. Obviously this is a simplified economy because there are only three products.
75. See GARY NORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN ECONOMICS vii (1973) (“God has
cursed the earth (Gen. 3:17-19). This is the starting point for all economic analy-
sis. The earth no longer gives up her fruits automatically. Man must sweat to
eat.”).
76. See Christopher P. Guzelian, Silver: A Morally Good Money, 15 PROCESOS DE
MERCADO 213, 214–27 (2018).
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There are three potential historical sources of the initial weight
table.77 One is a divine non-human source of wisdom: a benevolent
creator god told humans the intrinsic relative worth of silver, barley,
and fish, and thus the “true,” rate of exchange for them.78 Under this
deistic view, the relative values of things and labor are “intrinsic” and
the rate of exchange is “true” as if there were objective valuations that
the god has created for these things, even if those true values are un-
known to mankind. Modern subjectivist economics rejects this ontol-
ogy, as to be discussed below.
Why would a benevolent god have picked the weights that it did in
Table 1? I argue in a different publication that, in the Judeo-Christian
tradition, YHWH, the god, had ethical-factual concerns about human
survival and environmental sustainability.79 As such, and by the as-
sumption that certain fixed weight ratios of silver money, fish, and
barley at that time would prevent unsustainable overharvesting of
any one (or more) of the three products, an all-knowing and benevo-
lent YHWH sought to ensure optimal human lives and a healthy
environment.80
If it was indeed a god who set up an original relative weight table,
then the third ensuing question is whether the god intended these rel-
ative weight ratios to be changeable, based either on changing relative
human preferences for fish and barley, or because the god preferred or
needed to value raw silver (money) differently with respect to the con-
sumer products. This is a question whose answer depends on scrip-
tural interpretation.81
A second possible way the weight table came into existence disre-
gards the supernatural, and instead claims an ancient “original” sov-
ereign government (fallible humans rather than an infallible god)
mandated the first weight table. Unlike YHWH, that sovereign was
not all-knowing, and thus could not have guessed the optimal “true”
77. Katsuhito Iwai has written a trenchant paper insisting that theory alone cannot
illumine the historical origins of money, notwithstanding many competing efforts
among economists and anthropologists to do so. Instead, he insists upon histori-
cal analysis as the only solvent method for uncovering such origins. KATSUHITO
IWAI, EVOLUTION OF MONEY, EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC DIVERSITY 396, 396 (Ugo
Pagano & Antonio Nicita, eds.) (2001). This Article regards Iwai’s approach as
correctly analyzed. Although Part II of the present Article might be regarded as
theory, it is grounded in American and biblical history to make its case for why
the dollar has become damaging.
78. Cf. Leviticus 27:16 (“If a person consecrates to the Lord any inherited landhold-
ing, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirements: fifty shek-
els of silver to a homer of barley seed.”). See also Matthew 17:24–27 (Jesus
equating one fish with one Greek silver “stater” coin).
79. See Guzelian, supra note 76, at 214–27.
80. Id.
81. Matthew 5:17–18.
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relative weights. This fact of fallibility might not have stopped the sov-
ereign from trying to estimate the optimal exchanges.82
Indeed, this sovereign human effort is reminiscent of the top-down
approach of modern central banks as they establish interest rates, ex-
change rates, and money supply. In effect, such a sovereign was play-
ing God. What cannot be assumed is that the sovereign was
benevolent like YHWH and sought to maximally sustain human life
and the environment. The sovereign, unlike the benevolent god, may
not be benevolent and may have other philosophical aims.83 And, in
any event, the sovereign is not all-knowing and therefore would be
unlikely to correctly set ratios, if even that were his purpose and such
ratios existed.84
The third question—whether the sovereign allows the relative
weight ratio to change—is more likely to be answered in the affirma-
tive than in the case of the god. This is because the sovereign may be
replaced by another, the sovereign’s personal philosophy or prefer-
ences may change, or because any sovereign is fallible and therefore
constantly “tweaking” the exchange ratio as economic information be-
comes available.85
82. See, e.g., 2 Samuel 14:26 (“Whenever he cut the hair of his head . . . he would
weigh it, and its weight was two hundred shekels by the royal standard.”) (em-
phasis added).
83. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FAQs, FED. RES. (Aug. 9,
2017) (contending that “central banks [seek] to achieve macroeconomic policy
objectives such as price stability, full employment, and stable economic growth”),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12855.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/
WD74-FSTY].
84. See, e.g., Friedrich Hayek, Nobel Prize Acceptance Lecture: The Pretense of
Knowledge (Dec. 11, 1974) (transcript available at https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/economics/1974/hayek/lecture/ [https://perma.unl.edu/SZT9-G983]). Hayek
stated:
[W]hen we are asked for quantitative evidence for the particular struc-
ture of prices and wages that would be required in order to assure a
smooth continuous sale of the products and services offered, we must
admit that we have no such information. We know, in other words, the
general conditions in which what we call, somewhat misleadingly, an
equilibrium will establish itself: but we never know what the particular
prices or wages are which would exist if the market were to bring about
such an equilibrium.
Id.
85. But see Davis H. Waite, Are the Silver States Ruined?, 158 NORTH AM. REV. 24
(1894). Waite, then-Governor of Colorado, wrote:
When Congress, in 1792, created a money unit for the United States and
specified 3711/4 grains fine silver as composing that unit and the Ameri-
can dollar, the trust given to Congress by the States to fix the value of
the American dollar and of foreign coins was executed, and thenceforth
neither the trustor (the States) nor the trustee (Congress) had any power
whatever to recall or change the performance of the trust . . . . [T]hat
greatest of constitutional lawyers, Daniel Webster, [said]: “gold and sil-
ver, at rates fixed by Congress, constitute the legal standard of value in
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Yet a great number of modern free market economists caution
there is no such thing as intrinsic value of any material thing; value is
subjective and is established in each case of exchange by the ends that
people are trying to achieve by way of the means they are seeking to
procure and use.86 Under this theory, there would have been no “true,
god- or sovereign-given” progenitor weight ratio, but rather any such a
ratio that existed spontaneously emerged and continuously changes as
a result of specific human needs, preferences, and negotiation at a
particular moment in time between specific trading partners for par-
ticular goods or services.87 The ratio is the product of spontaneous or-
der and is always dynamic and subject to fluid, sometimes rapid,
change.88
Let us begin, as the ancients did, with the belief that, of the three
possibilities of how raw silver could have come to be the original
money in our hypothetical economy,89 the truth is that it was via a
deity’s mandate.90 A benevolent god ordained raw silver to be the
economy’s first money, and it was the well-meaning god who also es-
tablished the relative weight ratio table seen in Table 1. Because the
god is well-meaning, this was done to preserve human life and to
maintain a sustainable environment (also a prerequisite to preserving
human life).91 By establishing relative values of the goods, the god has
also implicitly established how much relative human effort will go to-
this country, and neither Congress nor any State has authority to estab-
lish any other standard or to displace that standard.”
Id. at 26–27 (emphasis in original).
86. CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 120–21 (2007). Menger writes:
Value is [ ] nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an inde-
pendent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make
about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance
of their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the con-
sciousness of men. It is, therefore, also quite erroneous to call a good that
has value to economizing individuals a “value,” or for economists to
speak of “values” as of independent real things, and to objectify value in
this way. . . . Objectification of the value of goods, which is entirely sub-
jective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion
about the basic principles of our science.
Id.
87. See generally 1 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM
(1991).
88. See JESU´S HUERTA DE SOTO, THE THEORY OF DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY passim (2009).
89. A conceivable fourth approach to relative weight ratios—a hybrid approach—be-
gins with a top-down mandate either from a god or a sovereign to “seed” or “start”
the market process, such as we saw in Table 1, but then allows for market-driven
dynamics to take over and cause the relative table values to fluctuate for some or
all exchanges.
90. For purposes of this Article, it actually would not matter if the means by which
silver became the original, first money were through spontaneous (evolutionary)
order. The key point is to assume that raw silver was not fiat money—meaning
the first money did not come into existence via a top-down human edict.
91. See Guzelian, supra note 76, at 214–27.
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wards the production of each good. Some will be silver miners, some
fisherman, and some farmers. Again, the dispersion of human effort is
optimal if the god is well-meaning.
Imagine in this realm where god decreed the original money (raw
silver) and set the original weight table for the pious society of miners,
farmers, and fishermen, but now a human sovereign (e.g., king, em-
peror, czar, etc.) comes into place.92 The sovereign expects compensa-
tion for leadership and exercises his governmental right to exact
taxes.93 If the sovereign wants flexibility in using the revenue he
earns through taxes, he will typically expect money for the tax—the
numeraire intermediate good through which all other resources can be
obtained. And if silver is money by divine mandate and the sovereign
wishes to adhere to that mandate, then the sovereign would mandate
tax payments in raw silver (functional currency)—as opposed to being
paid tribute in either barley or fish.
It is a fact of history that corrupt governments and traders have
sought to gain illegitimate economic advantage in their use of com-
modity moneys like silver by shaving corners off monetary units and
passing those units off as weighing more than they actually do. This
activity—debasement of the currency—surreptitiously reduces the
commodity value of money by altering its physical composition. Econo-
mists have long recognized that debasement represents an implicit
tax (dubbed “seigniorage”), and the tax can become onerous or de-
structive, even resulting in hyperinflations.94
But say our hypothetical sovereign is both entrepreneurially self-
serving and does not want to appear to his pious subjects to disregard
god’s mandates about money. In other words, he wants the personal
benefits of seigniorage without resorting to blatant physical debase-
ment of silver that he controls. He could start this process by announc-
ing the creation of a new product in the economy: “fiat silver.”95 Fiat
silver is not really a new good. It is merely a minted silver coin with
the king’s face upon it, much like this Tyrian Shekel, weighing 14.3g
92. How that sovereign is selected, and the legitimacy of that sovereign, are impor-
tant philosophical considerations for monetary theory, but those questions are
left unaddressed for this Article’s purposes.
93. Exodus 30:12–13 (When you take a census . . . each one who is registered shall
give half a shekel [of silver] according to the shekel of the sanctuary. . . .”).
94. See Nathan Sussman & Joseph Zeira, Commodity Money Inflation: Theory and
Evidence from France in 1350-1436, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 1769, 1769 (2003)
(showing that physical debasement of coinage has led to historical periods of
inflation).
95. In its earliest ancient forms, fiat money was minted silver or debased silver,
where the face value of the coin was decreed by the sovereign to be worth more
than the silver content of the coin. Coins arose around 630 BC (electrum coinage);
before that, money transactions used “hacksilber,” or cut up pieces of silver
weighed by scales. See RAZ KLETTER, ECONOMIC KEYSTONES: THE WEIGHT SYSTEM
OF THE KINGDOM OF JUDAH (David J.A. Clines & Philip R. Davies, eds.) (1998).
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and composed of greater than 95% silver, minted in Lebanon from
126BC–56AD.
The Tyrian Shekel: Ancient Fiat Silver
Source: Etsy.com96
There is some (let us say negligible) cost to the king for minting fiat
silver coins, but in any other respect this fourth product is just silver.
And henceforth, the king proclaims, all taxes must be paid not in raw
silver as would have been the case if he were following god’s orders,
but now in fiat silver (which is still silver and thus arguably not a
substitute money for the god’s mandate).
Taken on its own, this form of fiat money would appear to confer no
economic advantage on the king. If he were to barter his fiat silver
coins for raw silver, the exchange weight ratio should simply be 1:1.
However, let us say the king is swift to pass laws ensuring that his fiat
silver coin has legal features that raw silver (as money) does not. The
laws enacted alongside the kingly roll-out of fiat silver are strategi-
cally calculated to drive people towards exclusive use of the king’s cur-
rency, and eradication of the competing non-fiat money, raw silver.97
96. Antiquanova, Seller of Judas’ 30 Pieces of Siler – Palestine Tyros Shekel 100 BC
replica coin, ETSY (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.etsy.com/listing/94878218/judas-
30-pieces-of-silver-palestine?ref=related-7 [https://perma.unl.edu/6H8Q-D442].
97. Cf. Waite, supra note 85. Waite, then the Governor of Colorado, suggested that
Great Britain facilitated the eradication of the general silver standard in the
United States in 1857, replacing it with a U.S. fiat silver standard. Waite wrote:
Great Britain, which demonetized silver in 1816, secretly procured, in
the American Congress, the passage of an act, in 1857, providing that
“No foreign gold or silver coins shall be a legal tender for the payment of
debts.” At this time there was no pretence that the foreign silver dollars
were of depreciated value. In fact the bullion silver in these coins was
then actually worth more than their coin value. The act of 1857 removed
an ancient landmark, and reversed the policy of this government for
eighty-one years–thirteen years under the Continental Congress, 1776
to 1789, and sixty-eight years under our present form of government,
from 1789 to 1857.
Id. at 25–26.
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First, the king enacts a revised “functional currency” requirement
that henceforth all tax payments must be made in fiat silver rather
than raw silver. This mandate has the effect of guaranteeing a univer-
sal demand for the king’s monopoly product (fiat silver) because all
denizens must acquire at least enough of it to pay the king his owed
tributes.98
Second, the king enacts a legal tender law. This requires any credi-
tor to accept the fiat silver in place of raw silver or any other resource
when the debtor wishes to pay with such. Because there are incentives
for debtors to pay with fiat silver over raw silver (see below), legal
tender laws tend to drive out raw silver as the currency and substitute
fiat silver in its place.99
98. Krugman, supra note 1, at 3 (“[T]he value of a dollar doesn’t come entirely from
self-fulfilling expectations: ultimately, it’s backstopped by the fact that the U.S.
government will accept dollars as payment of tax liabilities—liabilities it’s able to
enforce because it’s a government.”).
99. That fiat money is likely to become relatively more attractive to hold than the
raw silver by way of legal tender has been an argument made in the favor of
invoking legal tender for fiat money. But Justice Field took exception with this
position, stating that it exceeds the proper limits of the government’s authority.
He noted:
The argument presented by the advocates of legal tender is, in sub-
stance, this: The object of borrowing is to raise funds, the addition of the
quality of legal tender to the notes of the government will induce parties
to take them, and funds will thereby be more readily loaned. But the
same thing may be said of the addition of any other quality which would
give to the holder of the notes some advantage over the property of
others, as, for instance, that the notes should serve as a pass on the pub-
lic conveyances of the country, or as a ticket to places of amusement, or
should exempt his property from state and municipal taxation, or entitle
him to the free use of the telegraph lines, or to a percentage from the
revenues of private corporations. The same consequence—a ready ac-
ceptance of the notes—would follow; and yet no one would pretend that
the addition of privileges of this kind with respect to the property of
others, over which the borrower has no control, would be in any sense an
appropriate measure to the execution of the power to borrow.
. . . .
The government, in substance, says to parties with whom it deals:
Lend us your money, or furnish us with your products or your labor, and
we will ultimately pay you, and as evidence of it we will give you our
notes, in such form and amount as may suit your convenience, and en-
able you to transfer them; we will also receive them for certain demands
due to us. In all this matter there is only a dealing between the govern-
ment and the individuals who trust it. The transaction concerns no
others. The power which authorizes it is a very different one from a
power to deal between parties to private contracts in which the govern-
ment is not interested, and to compel the receipt of these promises to pay
in place of the money for which the contracts stipulated. This latter
power is not an incident to the former; it is a distinct and far greater
power. There is no legal connection between the two—between the
power to borrow from those willing to lend and the power to interfere
with the independent contracts of others. The possession of this latter
power would justify the interference of the government with any rights
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Third, the king effects a ban on holding raw silver, requiring citi-
zens to turn in their raw silver in exchange for fiat silver. Much like
the legal tender and functional currency mandates, the ban on a non-
fiat money (here, raw silver) is a legal wedge designed to introduce the
fiat currency swiftly and widely into society.100
Finally and importantly, by substituting fiat silver for raw silver,
the king is able to establish a “legal seigniorage” (a sovereign “debase-
ment delta”) for his fiat money. The debasement delta is the change in
the relative worth of the king’s new money for the old money.101 In
other words, a “gram of fiat silver” is not the same weight as a “gram
of raw silver”102 (where the weight of a silver gram was set by the
god). The sovereign has created a new benchmark weight for the soci-
ety’s money (because of coercion and force of law invoked by legal
tender, non-fiat money bans, and functional currency regulations).
The sovereign has assumed the role of the god and set up a new rela-
tive weight ratio between fiat silver and raw silver that is not 1:1.103
of property of other parties, under the pretense that its allowance to the
holders of the notes would lead to their more ready acceptance, and thus
furnish the needed means.
Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 461–62 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting).
100. Cf. JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS
72 (2012) (“In a rapid sequence of moves, FDR had deftly confiscated private gold,
banned its export abroad and captured the gold mining industry. As a result,
Roosevelt greatly increased the U.S. hoard of official gold. Contemporary esti-
mates were that citizens surrendered over five hundred metric tons of gold to the
Treasury in 1933. The gold depository at Fort Knox was constructed in 1937 for
the specific purpose of holding the gold that had been confiscated from U.S. citi-
zens. There was no longer enough room in the basement of the Treasury.”).
101. Cf. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350 (1935) (“[I]f the terms of the govern-
ment [ ] as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows
that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated.”).
102. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
AMERICAN CONDITIONS 491 (6th ed. 1914) (“Fiat money is almost always, but not
necessarily, paper money. The silver rupee in India, for instance, was fiat money
from 1893 to 1899, because the government assigned to it a higher value . . . .”).
103. Compare Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 449 (“Congress may (as it did with regard to gold
by the act of June 28, 1834, c. 95, and with regard to silver by the act of February
28, 1878, c. 20) issue coins of the same denominations as those already current by
law, but of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of
the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the
payment of coins of the less real value.”) with id. at 465–66 (Field, J., dissenting).
Justice Field wrote:
Undoubtedly congress has power to alter the value of coins issued, either
by increasing or diminishing the alloy they contain; so it may alter, at its
pleasure, their denominations; it may hereafter call a dollar an eagle,
and it may call an eagle a dollar. But if it be intended to assert that
congress can make the coins changed the equivalent of those having a
greater value in their previous condition, and compel parties contracting
for the latter to receive coins with diminished value, . . . [a]ny such decla-
ration on its part would be not only utterly inoperative in fact, but a
shameful disregard of its constitutional duty. . . .
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To continue our thought experiment, it is vitally important to un-
derstand that any form of fiat money is traded through society prefer-
entially: it takes a path from the hands of the sovereign through
society. It is always the case that some trading parties receive fiat
money from the sovereign before others do.104 In our case, the fiat
Arbitrary and profligate governments have often resorted to this mis-
erable scheme of robbery, which Mill designates as a shallow and impu-
dent artifice, the ‘least covert of all modes of knavery, which consists in
calling a shilling a pound, that a debt of one hundred pounds may be
canceled by the payment of one hundred shillings.’
Id.
104. See MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE CASE AGAINST THE FED (2007). Rothbard refers to
any sovereign who issues fiat money as a legal “counterfeiter” and describes as
follows how this “counterfeit” money (i.e., fiat money) follows a damaging path
through the economy:
[F]irst the counterfeiters, then the retailers, etc., have new money and
monetary income which they use to bid up goods and services, increasing
their demand and raising the prices of the goods that they purchase. But
as prices of goods begin to rise in response to the higher quantity of
money, those who haven’t yet received the new money find the prices of
the goods they buy have gone up, while their own selling prices or in-
comes have not risen. In short, the early receivers of the new money in
this market chain of events gain at the expense of those who receive the
money toward the end of the chain, and still worse losers are the people
(e.g., those on fixed incomes such as annuities, interest, or pensions) who
never receive the new money at all. Monetary inflation, then, acts as a
hidden “tax” by which the early receivers expropriate (i.e., gain at the
expense of) the late receivers. And of course since the very earliest re-
ceiver of the new money is the counterfeiter, the counterfeiter’s gain is
the greatest. This tax is particularly insidious because it is hidden, be-
cause few people understand the processes of money and banking, and
because it is all too easy to blame the rising prices, or “price inflation,”
caused by the monetary inflation on greedy capitalists, speculators, wild-
spending consumers, or whatever social group is the easiest to denigrate.
Obviously, too, it is to the interest of the counterfeiters to distract atten-
tion from their own crucial role by denouncing any and all other groups
and institutions as responsible for the price inflation. . . .
The big error of all quantity theorists, from the British classicists to
Milton Friedman, is to assume that money is only a “veil,” and that in-
creases in the quantity of money only have influence on the price level,
or on the purchasing power of the money unit. On the contrary, it is one
of the notable contributions of “Austrian School” economists and their
predecessors, such as the early-eighteenth-century Irish-French econo-
mist Richard Cantillon, that, in addition to this quantitative, aggrega-
tive effect, an increase in the money supply also changes the distribution
of income and wealth. The ripple effect also alters the structure of rela-
tive prices, and therefore of the kinds and quantities of goods that will be
produced, since the counterfeiters and other early receivers will have dif-
ferent preferences and spending patterns from the late receivers who are
“taxed” by the earlier receivers. Furthermore, these changes of income
distribution, spending, relative prices, and production will be permanent
and will not simply disappear, as the quantity theorists blithely assume,
when the effects of the increase in the money supply will have worked
themselves out.
In sum, the Austrian insight holds that counterfeiting will have far
more unfortunate consequences for the economy than simple inflation of
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money is fiat silver: minted silver legally required to be worth more
than the base content of the metal would be when exchanged for other
goods or services. The silver merchants and miners are the first to
receive it because they are the ones who provide most of the raw silver
the king uses to mint his fiat silver (who then pays them in fiat silver).
So in exchange for 1 gram of raw silver provided to the king, the king
might pay them back only 0.75 grams of fiat silver (in the form of a
minted coin)—even assuming negligible minting costs. The king has
therefore, via fiat, created a legal seigniorage that I call a “debase-
ment delta.” In other words, 0.75g fiat silver = 1g silver, by sovereign
legal decree.105 And the merchants must receive the fiat silver rather
than raw silver in a trade because of legal tender (it settles the debt,
by proclamation of the king), functional currency requirements (the
merchants need fiat silver to pay the king’s subsequent taxes), and
bans on non-fiat money (they are prohibited to use raw silver as
money henceforth except in acquiring fiat silver from the king).
The silver merchants forfeit some of the previous exchange value of
their raw silver in exchange for the king’s minted fiat silver. But they
in turn, by being first in line to receive the fiat silver, can then spend
it as fiat, creating their own, second “debasement delta” by doing so.106
So, the silver trader who gave up some extra raw silver to the king
to get fiat silver in turn then takes the fiat silver and demands, say,
more bushels of barley than he would have previously. The barley
farmer, in turn, is compelled by legal tender (even if he asked for raw
silver for payment, he must accept fiat silver) and functional currency
requirements (he needs fiat silver to pay the tax) and non-fiat money
bans (he cannot spend his existing raw silver reserves, if any, except
to acquire fiat silver) to accept the fiat silver, which is now under
the price level. There will be other, and permanent, distortions of the
economy away from the free market pattern that responds to consumers
and property-rights holders in the free economy. This brings us to an
important aspect of counterfeiting which should not be overlooked. In
addition to its more narrowly economic distortion and unfortunate con-
sequences, counterfeiting gravely cripples the moral and property rights
foundation that lies at the base of any free-market economy.
Id. at 24–26.
105. Cf. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 548–49 (1870) (“No one ever doubted that a debt of
1000 dollars, contracted before 1834, could be paid by 100 eagles coined after that
year, though they contained no more gold than ninety-four eagles such as were
coined when the contract was made, and this, not because of the intrinsic value of
the coin, but because of its legal value.”).
106. Note this debasement delta, rather than being a seigniorage taken in by the sov-
ereign, as is commonly understood by “seigniorage,” is a form of economic rent
enjoyed by the monopoly or oligopoly holders of the fiat silver who preferentially
received it from the sovereign before others did. Accord Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. 603, 621 (1869) (“[I]t may be said that the depreciation will be less to him
who takes [fiat currency] from the government, if the government will pledge to
him its power to compel his creditors to receive them at par in payments.”).
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oligopolistic control of the silver merchants as first in line to have re-
ceived it from the king. So, if raw silver originally traded at 1 gram:1
bushel of barley (see Table 1), then the fiat silver might now trade at
0.6 gram:1 bushel of barley. This is because the farmer has need of fiat
silver, which has arbitrary supply at the pleasure of the sovereign, to
whom the farmer must return some or all the fiat currency in the form
of tax. And the silver merchant can compel the trade even if originally
raw silver, not fiat silver, was the pledged reciprocal item in the trade,
due to the legal tender enactment. Notice the debasement delta
through this second trade has increased from 0.25 (the initial delta
that the king exacted on the silver merchants by setting the ratio at
0.75g fiat silver:1g silver) to 0.4 (the secondary delta that the silver
merchants exacted on the barley farmers who don’t have direct access
to the king’s fiat silver for a trade at 0.75g delta). Notice also that
through such transactions with accompanying legal enforcements, the
fiat silver begins to eradicate demand for raw silver as a possession
and money.
In turn, the barley farmer now must make up the loss in weight (or
purity) of raw silver that he has suffered in his exchange for his bar-
ley. His options are as follows: (1) to over-extract more barley to make
up the loss in raw silver received due to the debasement deltas (this
unsustainable farming tends to cause long-lasting environmental
damage);107 (2) to barter in his future trades with other resource hold-
107. The discussion of the damaging environmental effects of high-interest govern-
ment loan subsidies, and legally supported fiat money is starting to find its way
into the economic literature. Elsewhere, I have written,
[Farmer] Wendell Berry (2010) cautions that unless we sustain the
Great Economy (Earth), the Little Economy (human commerce) will not
survive. Berry gives an example from his own experience: tobacco farm-
ing. Common farming wisdom is that because tobacco is an exceptional
nitrogen-robbing plant, if one plants tobacco in year one, then the topsoil
should be restored via beans or other cover crops in year two (i.e. tobacco
can only be grown in alternate years). One can push it, and plant tobacco
on the same ground in consecutive year two and still get a good yield, in
defiance of good practices, but then the ground is nitrogen-poor for seven
years. If one plants three years consecutively (which results in declining
yields in year three), then the ground is dead for all farming purposes for
twenty-five years.
Berry’s point is that many farmers feel compelled by immediate eco-
nomic necessitude of repaying compounding interest on farming loans
(particularly high interest loans) to plant rapidly over the short term in
defiance of good practices. He contends the incalculable long-term envi-
ronmental harm is being ignored because of desire for short-term profit-
ability. Particularly if land is monetarily cheap, one might be able to just
buy or relocate to other acreage once the original ground has been
pushed beyond its recoverable limits. But this results in a global race-to-
the-bottom of topsoil destruction. This same concept plays out for many
other renewable resources, for example overfishing, clear-cutting of for-
ests, or aquifer collapse due to over-extraction of water. In this fashion,
many resources that would be renewable if used sustainably become ex-
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ers rather than resort to fiat silver payments (barter limits the robust-
ness of his trading capacity and is not incentivized when the farmer
has the option to wield to his own benefit the fiat silver he now pos-
sesses by creating a third debasement delta when he seeks other, non-
silver resources); or (3) he exacts his own debasement delta in the next
trade he commences (for fish) using fiat silver in place of raw silver or
barley.
A key point is that this path of spending a particular piece of fiat
money starting out of the hands of the sovereign eventually must
reach an end.108 There is some final person or group in society who
suffers the full weight of multiple rounds of debasement deltas being
created by the issuance of a round of fiat money.109 In our economy of
four resources (fiat silver, raw silver, barley, and fish), there have al-
ready been transactions of fiat silver for raw silver, and then barley,
and now there may be a transaction for the final product: fish. Assume
the fisherman (although it need not be so) is a primitive hunter/gath-
erer at the outer limits of unsophistication in a sophisticated economy.
That fisherman has little need for money, living basically a subsis-
tence life, but does have tax obligations to the sovereign, as all citizens
do. Whenever the fisherman did trade prior to the introduction of fiat
silver, he traded, per Table 1, 2 fish for 1g raw silver, or 2 fish for 1
bushel of barley. What started with the king and silver merchants as a
trade ratio of 0.75g fiat silver:1g raw silver led the silver merchants to
demand their own debasement delta of 1g fiat silver:1.67 bushels of
barley (1/(1-0.4)) (where it should have been 1g raw silver:1 bushel
barley if we take into account the trading ratios of 2 fish:1 bushel of
barley and 2 fish:1g of raw silver).
tinct when taken in an unsustainable way with a focus upon immediate
profitability.
. . . [S]uch troubling environmental degradation spawned by unreasona-
ble toil may occur even for so-called “renewable” resources. This is to say
nothing of the acquisition of “non-renewable” resources that sometimes
causes irreversible pollution, such as fossil fuels and mining (e.g. pre-
cious metals, uranium, etc). In particular, energy demand has proved so
bottomless that the phase-in of a newer, environmentally cleaner source
(e.g. oil) over an older, more greatly polluting source (e.g. coal) has not at
all slowed production of the latter.
Guzelian, supra note 76, at 223–24 (citing WENDELL BERRY, WHAT MATTERS? ECO-
NOMICS FOR A RENEWED COMMONWEALTH (2010); Daniel Yergin, The Power Revo-
lutions, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 1, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-power-revolutions-1440172598 [https://perma.unl.edu/4B9A-NCLZ]). See also
Leah H. Palm-Forster, Jordan F. Suter, & Kent D. Messer, Experimental Evi-
dence on Policy Approaches That Link Agricultural Subsidies to Water Quality
Outcomes, 101 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 109 (2018) (finding from experimental studies
that “results suggest that water quality policies that rely on the threat of subsidy
reductions are a potentially viable option for reducing ambient water pollution.”).
108. See ROTHBARD, supra note 104.
109. The king can create arbitrary scarcity or surplusage of fiat currency by unilater-
ally deciding how much to issue.
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Now the barley farmer wields his fiat silver, just as the silver min-
ers invoked a delta against him, by demanding, say, 6 fish for the fiat
silver. The third debasement delta is now 0.73 (1 - (1.67 bushels of
barley/6 fish)). The fisherman, needing the relatively more expensive
fiat silver to pay taxes, is now in the predicament that to pay the tax
he must catch 3.7x the number of fish (1/0.73) as when raw silver was
currency. This is on top of the barley farmer’s previous 1.67x over-
extraction of barley.
Thus, because of fiat silver’s introduction, the fiat poor fisherman
must invariably work harder and has the following options: (1) take
often unrepayable loans to maintain his level of current subsistence
(leading to compounded environmental destruction110); (2) choose to
subsist with far less catch for himself (and risk starvation); (3) aban-
don fishing and try to enter the silver miner trade where he is more
proximate to the sovereign source of fiat money and does not suffer the
cascading effect of debasement deltas, or better yet, become a patron
of the king himself, who may pay him directly in fiat silver for his
labor (which might amount to mundane tasks like writing legal essays
about the kingly court); (4) engage in thievery to make up the deficit;
(5) commit suicide; or (6) flee the kingdom to escape his plight. Also
important to note is that there is no seventh option to barter his fish
for barley (or other goods and services), as the fisherman will now
have no incentivized trading partners who have all begun to use fiat
silver rather than raw silver. The fisherman is being squeezed out of
existence as the fiat poor in the cascading chain of debasement deltas
caused by the introduction of fiat currency, legal tender, and func-
tional currency plus tax requirements. It also tends to displace occu-
pations closest to food production.111
The upshot of this economic thought experiment is that because of
the sovereign debasement delta (and ensuing debasement deltas cre-
ated by every other person in society in the cascading path of the fiat
money) certain fiat poor in society are effectively locked out of the abil-
ity to participate in the economy—or even just to exist—while para-
doxically still demanded and coerced to participate in the economy.
The harmful effects of fiat silver when combined with functional
currency requirements were known to the ancients. In the Gospel of
Matthew in the New Testament Bible, Jesus’s Miracle of the Coin in
the Fish’s Mouth relates exactly this problem of the fiat poor.112 St.
110. See Griswold, 75 U.S. at 632–34.
111. In the United States, the number of farmers since 1920 declined from 30.2% of
the population (when many people were subsistence farmers) to less than 1% in
the latest 2007 census of agriculture. See J.Z. Kalbacher & D. Deare, Farm Popu-
lation of the United States, 1985, 59 CURR. POPUL. REP. POPUL. CHARACT. 1, 1
(1986); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., Census of Agriculture (2007), https://www.nass
.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2007/ [https://perma.unl.edu/46PS-WPNZ].
112. Matthew 17:24–27.
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Peter was an illiterate, primitive hunter-gatherer with little need for
money who subsisted on his fishing catches. Confronted by Israelite
tax authorities to pay them the Tyrian Shekel113 (the fiat silver coin of
the Temple Treasury that was demanded in an annual head tax on all
adult male Israelites), Peter, who had even abandoned his limited
subsistence toil to follow Jesus, was likely flat broke with no fiat silver
(or fish) to his name. Yet, his economic participation was demanded of
him in fiat currency, or else he would be imprisoned or worse.
Peter could have set about frantically fishing (his only discernible
economic skill) to try to create enough “value” to trade for a Tyrian
Shekel. That would have required far more (unsustainable) fishing on
his part than would have been the case in an economy without fiat
silver. Or he could have taken out unrepayable loans. Or he could
have pled for the king’s mercy and sought menial work in the king’s
court as a result, abandoning a career of fishing. Or he could have
stolen a Tyrian Shekel. Or he could have committed suicide. Or he
could have fled and become a refugee. Or Peter needed a miracle.
Jesus gave him one; he told Peter to go fish, and to look in the
mouth of the first fish Peter caught. There, Peter found a “stater” (a
silver coin that was either the Tyrian Shekel or possibly an Athenian
Tetradrachm, which would have been likewise accepted as full pay-
ment of the fiat currency tax).114 Seldom do humans find valuable sil-
ver coins in the mouths of living fish. It is an unnatural phenomenon.
It means that one’s labor (fishing) yields two normally unpaired re-
sources and eliminates the need for trade to get one or the other.
There are two major modern economic theories of value: Marx’s la-
bor theory of value and Menger’s subjective theory of value.115 I think
Jesus was dismissive—not entirely, but mostly—of Marx’s labor the-
ory of value, as he showed in this Miracle story that even a fiat poor
need not toil above a minor amount. Peter’s fishing required light
work (surely no more than 20 minutes of his time) to pay a heavy fiat
tax. Thus, labor—while Jesus requested it of Peter—was a de minimis
part of the Miracle story (unlike Marx’s labor theory of value).116
113. See KLETTER, supra note 95; picture of Tyrian Shekel.
114. Guzelian, supra note 76, at 232.
115. Gene Callahan, Carl Menger: The Nature of Value, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (Oct.
17, 2003), https://mises.org/library/carl-menger-nature-value [https://perma.unl
.edu/D57J-ZRKQ].
116. See Matthew 6:25–33 (“Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you
will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more than
food, and the body more than clothes? Look at the birds of the air; they do not sow
or reap or store away in barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you
not much more valuable than they? Can any one of you by worrying add a single
hour to your life? And why do you worry about clothes? See how the flowers of the
field grow. They do not labor or spin . . .  If that is how God clothes the grass of
the field, which is here today and tomorrow is thrown into the fire, will he not
much more clothe you—you of little faith? So do not worry, saying, ‘What shall we
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But now we turn to Menger’s subjective theory of value, endorsed
by both neoclassical and Austrian economists. The subjective theory of
value advances the idea that the use-value (i.e., the utility) of a good is
not determined by any inherent property of the good, nor by the
amount of labor necessary to produce the good. Rather, use-value is
determined exclusively by the importance an acting individual places
on a good for the achievement of his desired ends, which is typically
reflected by the price paid for the good.117 To a subjectivist, undis-
torted market exchange values (prices) are therefore a perfect (and the
only) reflection of economic actors’ use-values of goods and services
(utility).118
In the Miracle story, Peter faces a paradox. He must eat to live.
Simultaneously, he must have fiat silver—a Tyrian Shekel—to live (or
else he will be imprisoned, beaten, and probably killed by a coercive
government). According to a subjective theory of value, in the circum-
stances Peter finds himself, any self-preserving person should place
equally vast importance on simultaneously having both a Tyrian
Shekel and a fish. Peter has neither, and indeed, the fiat money and
functional currency system has guaranteed that he, a fiat poor, would
eventually reach a point where he would have neither.119 Indeed, it is
no accident that a historical account of the two equally and infinitely
valued goods at issue for a fiat poor involved fiat money and subsis-
tence food.
The subjective theory of value supposes that trades will occur (and
a price will form) whenever two people have use-value of the other’s
property more than their own property. But the subjective theory of
value is, contrary to some economists’ claims of its universal applica-
bility, an incomplete economic theory of value under a market-dis-
torting fiat currency system. To a subjectivist looking to the price
formed in a trade for all information about a person’s use-values of a
good or service, the fact that fiat poor are not trading (and thereby not
eat?’ or ‘What shall we drink?’ or ‘What shall we wear?’ For the pagans run after
all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them. But seek
first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things will be given to you
as well.”) (emphasis added).
117. Robert P. Murphy, Subjective-Value Theory, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (May 30,
2011), https://mises.org/library/subjective-value-theory [https://perma.unl.edu/
M6G8-KP6Y] (providing instructional overview of subjective value theory).
118. Despite its widespread adoption, some economists criticize the theory, because
they believe it “is in many ways a fairly crude attempt to combine use-value and
exchange-value” and “object to the idea that prices merely reflect subjective valu-
ations for the basic reason of circularity: prices must be calculated before subjec-
tive valuation takes place, so they cannot purely reflect subjective values.”
Reconsidering the Labour Theory of Value, UNLEARNING ECONOMICS BLOG (July
20, 2013), https://unlearningeconomics.wordpress.com/tag/labour-theory-of-
value/ [https://perma.unl.edu/LTJ9-WZL9].
119. See ROTHBARD, supra note 104.
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establishing prices) would seem to indicate that they do not value
highly enough the resource they otherwise claim to be seeking. But a
fiat system produces such catastrophic poverty for fiat poor that their
use-values and exchange values for food and fiat money become un-
bundled—something that should not happen according to the subjec-
tive theory of value. Upon introspection, we can understand as fellow
human beings that their use-values for food and fiat silver are clearly
non-zero, yet their exchange values are zero because fiat poor need
both simultaneously to survive and therefore cannot part with either.
Furthermore, a striking immorality is made clear through the lens
of the subjective theory of value under a fiat money system: if Peter
cannot get through trade, production, or unlawful means (e.g., steal-
ing) the necessary fish and Tyrian Shekel to live (his desired end),
then he must logically shift his desired end according to the subjective
theory of value. He must seek to die or flee the kingdom. Suicide be-
comes a logical end to seek when the preferred end (living) is frus-
trated. And so, because suicide is nearly costless in terms of resources,
Peter may change his end and choose suicide.
In other words, in a world where some form of fiat money, legal
tender, functional currency, and non-fiat money ban system is an all-
but-assured reality, the subjective theory of value accepts (or at least
does not rule out) suicide, migration, or a life of thievery for fiat poor—
usually those closest to raw resources and the land—as economic
modes of action.120 As the fiat poor dies or leaves, someone else takes
the place of the fiat poor in the next cascade of fiat money. And then
that person should choose suicide or thievery. A fiat-driven world with
legal enforcements is a harbinger of a collective suicide and outlaw
pact.
Most ethicists do not endorse suicide or thievery as legitimate aims
of humans,121 although some economists who endorse subjective value
theory are indifferent to them.122 The subjective theory of value—
where man is the measure of all means’ value—admits as a logical
conclusion that a fiat poor should commit theft or suicide without any
120. Debbie Weingarten, Why Are America’s Farmers Killing Themselves?, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/06/
why-are-americas-farmers-killing-themselves-in-record-numbers [https://perma
.unl.edu/AM2X-FXS6] (reporting American farmers’ suicide rate is the highest of
any occupation and concluding that farmers’ “rate of self-imposed death rises and
falls in accordance with their economic well-being.”).
121. Cf. MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2007) (appealing secularly to the
idea that certain objective truths about ethics exist and are discernible).
122. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS, 95–96 (1998)
(“The notions of abnormality and perversity therefore have no place in economics
. . . Any examination of [man’s] ultimate ends turns out to be purely subjective
and therefore arbitrary.”).
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concern on our parts. We are up against an immoral and incomplete
theory of value if taken on its own.
Instead, we might conjecture that the ontology of value is such that
people’s economic use values (utilities) are at least partly supernatu-
ral and objective—established by a god rather than by mankind. Then
the fiat poor paradox is resolved if the god, like Jesus in the miracu-
lous coin in the fish’s mouth story, can intervene miraculously on be-
half of the fiat poor to provide the basic things with objective value (in
the god’s eyes) that they need but cannot exchange for under fiat
money systems with legal enforcements. They can then choose life
over death and lawfulness over thievery and residence over migration
as the ends they subjectively value. Therefore, in any economy with
fiat money (and as the coin story shows, the world has long had such
economies), it cannot be the case that value is entirely in the hands of
men to decide. The god who had an invisible hand on the entire econ-
omy when selecting raw silver as money, will inject value as he sees
fit, even by supernaturally fulfilling the need of the fiat poor for re-
sources to exchange while still remaining within the laws and eco-
nomic activity of society. The godless fiat system, by contrast,
substitutes finite, top-down human judgment for the god’s omniscient
judgment, with problematic results.
B. The Fiat Money Thought Experiment, Part 2: From Fiat
Silver to Fiat Notes
Imagine now two developments in the economy. First, paper and
ink have been invented, becoming new commodities that circulate and
are traded. Second, fiat silver has entirely displaced and replaced raw
silver as the money of the economy. This in itself takes time, as re-
peated rounds of fiat silver are issued. But gradually, the privately
held stock of raw silver is whittled away as uses of it become
nonexistent.
After some period of time, the sovereign decides to issue a new fiat
currency in place of fiat silver. This currency could be a paper-and-ink
note, such as those circulated in China as early as 805AD:
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Chinese Tang Dynasty paper note (860–873AD,
ca. 1800AD replica)
Source: Tom Chao’s Paper Money Gallery123
Consequently, there are now six possible commodities in our hypo-
thetical economy (raw silver, fiat silver, barley, fish, paper-and-ink,
and fiat paper-and-ink bills). However, as we noted earlier, raw silver
already largely disappeared as an exchanged commodity because of
the introduction of fiat silver and its attendant laws.
The switch is now from one fiat currency (fiat silver) to another
(fiat paper-and-ink), rather than from a divinely mandated or sponta-
neously evolved money (raw silver) to a fiat money (fiat silver). The
sovereign will transfer legal tender and functional currency status to
fiat paper-and-ink and remove those powers from fiat silver. In addi-
tion, the government will ban holdings of fiat silver (just as it did for
raw silver). Thus, by force of law alone, the same powers that fiat sil-
ver once held are now bestowed exclusively on fiat paper-and-ink.
A consequence of this shift from fiat silver to fiat paper-and-ink is
that the sovereign can exact a new round of debasement delta, above
and beyond that already extracted by the transition from silver to fiat
silver.124 Economists often distinguish commodity money (like silver)
123. Tom Chao, World Banknote Collection, TOM CHAO’S PAPER MONEY GALLERY, http:/
/tomchao.com/as/as8.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9T68-5MR4]. (last visited Feb.
25, 2019).
124. See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (McReynolds, J., dissent-
ing) (“To such counterfeit profits there would be no limit; with each new debase-
ment of the dollar they would expand. Two billions might be ballooned
indefinitely—to twenty, thirty, or what you will.”).
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that can be debased and fiat money, which they claim cannot be de-
based.125 This would suggest that the major thrust of this Article—
that fiat money and its attendant laws are a form of government-in-
duced debasement—is wrong. But this contention by economists that
fiat money is somehow “impervious” to debasement is itself incorrect.
All fiat money is commodity money. Fiat silver is comprised of silver.
Fiat paper-and-ink bills are comprised of paper fibers and ink. And as
we shall see in the next section, fiat digital currency is made of elec-
tricity and algorithms, among other things.
As this Article has repeatedly stressed, fiat money achieves a
“delta” (roughly equivalent conceptually to seignorage achieved via de-
basement) through the attendant laws that coerce its use. The magni-
tude of this new delta is determined by the sovereign’s effective
enforcement of those laws.126 The magnitude of the new delta is also
determined by the exchange value of the commodity underlying the
new fiat currency prior to its use as fiat currency. In our present ex-
ample, for fiat paper-and-ink to come into existence, paper milling and
ink production have to occur first. Thus, the commodities of paper and
ink will enter the economy before fiat paper-and-ink bills do.
There are two operative questions, then. First, what was the ex-
change weight ratio of fiat silver to paper and ink (equivalent to the
amounts put into a fiat paper-and-ink bill) before paper-and-ink bills
became fiat? Second, what was the exchange weight ratio of fiat silver
to fiat paper-and-ink after paper-and-ink became the fiat currency?
As one way of estimating this, one could ask how much does the
inclusion of fake paper-and-ink money in a Monopoly game board set
(where the notes are obviously bundled with other items) raise the
price to the game’s buyer? That price increase is the commodity cost of
paper-and-ink bills, not the fiat value of the bills. If, once the fiat pa-
per-and-ink currency is created, the exchange value of fiat paper-and-
ink is higher relative to fiat silver than the commodity exchange value
of raw paper-and-ink (e.g., Monopoly play-money paper-and-ink bills),
125. Lefteris Tsoulfidis, Debasement, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CENTRAL BANKING
(Louis-Philippe Rochon & Sergio Rossi, eds.) 135–36 (2015) (“Debasement is a
practice easily recognizable in the case of commodity money. However, we cannot
say the same thing in the case of a fiduciary or fiat monetary system, which is not
directly backed by a commodity: the money in circulation is instituted as such by
government. The altering of value in a fiat money system is a much more difficult
practice and occurs when the money supply exceeds its demand.”). But see George
Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money, 17 J. FIN. STABILITY 92 (2015) (arguing that
some moneys such as Bitcoin and Swiss dinars possess attributes of both com-
modity and synthetic money).
126. Cf. Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 669, 715
(2010) (“[L]iability must be correctly internalized as an individual’s behavioral
norm to be effective. Thus, liability is far more than just a monetary penalty or
incarceration. Liability is speech intended to signal what behaviors are socially
acceptable and unacceptable.”).
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then we may conclude that a new debasement delta for fiat paper-and-
ink exists.
To demonstrate the existence of this debasement delta in modern
terms, consider that the Federal Reserve estimates that it costs any-
where from 5.5 cents (for $1 bills) to 14.2 cents (for $100 bills) to print
fiat paper-and-ink bills:127
U.S. Fiat $100 bill
Source: Pinterest128
Fiat cents are fractions of the fiat dollar, a fractional decimal sys-
tem of currency proposed by Thomas Jefferson.129 Modern U.S. fiat
silver coinage (American Eagle dollars), which are imprinted with a
stated value of “1 U.S. dollar,” are 99.9% pure silver, and weigh 1
ounce (28.35g).
127. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., How Much Does it Cost to Produce
Currency and Coin? (March 2018) https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_
12771.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/9JUH-LYZ3].
128. Steven Zitar, PINTEREST, https://www.pinterest.com/pin/335588609718100051/
[https://perma.unl.edu/X68U-RUQ6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
129. See NAT’L HIST. PUBLICATIONS & REC. COMMISSION, Editorial Note: Jefferson’s
Notes on Coinage https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-
0151-0001 [https://perma.unl.edu/64BQ-FUH3] (describing Jefferson’s 1784 pro-
posal to create a fractional currency system).
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Fiat American Eagle Silver Dollar
Source: Coinnews.net130
On November 2, 2018, the exchange rate for an American Eagle
was $17.45 in fiat paper currency.131 Thus, in terms of exchange val-
ues, the underlying commodity value of paper-and-ink used to make a
modern fiat $1 bill (5.5 cents) and $100 bill (14.2 cents) would amount
to $0.960 (i.e., 17.45 x 0.055) and $2.47 (i.e., 17.45 x 0.142) worth of
fiat silver, respectively. In other words, a $1 fiat paper-and-ink bill
translates to only about $0.96 worth of fiat silver (a debasement delta
of 0.04) and a $100 fiat paper-and-ink bill amounts to only $2.47 worth
of fiat silver (a staggering debasement delta of 0.975).
The upshot of this analysis is that by substituting a new fiat cur-
rency for the existing one and by simultaneously imbuing the new cur-
rency with the three attendant laws discussed throughout this Article,
the sovereign can iteratively exact a new round of legal seigniorage
from the population in the form of new debasement deltas. In turn,
those citizens transactionally closest to the king (e.g. paper mill own-
ers and ink producers) receive the fiat paper-and-ink first and can ex-
act their own sequential, new debasement deltas, cascading down
until once again fiat poor are affected significantly and adversely, and
the environment deteriorates. Simultaneously, the old fiat currency—
fiat silver—is gradually or abruptly phased out of the economy, as no
rational individual would retain it for general transactional use when
its legal, fiat value is so diminished relative to the new paper-and-ink
currency. And clever merchants who have caught wind of this shift
from the sovereign before it happens shift their resource ownership
from silver mining to the paper industry.
130. Darrin Lee Unser, 2018-With Proof American Silver Eagle Release, (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://www.coinnews.net/2018/01/04/w-proof-american-silver-eagle/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/8A2B-CCE5].
131. Silver Coins & Bars, GOLDDEALER.COM, https://www.golddealer.com/product-cate
gory/products-2/bullion/silver-bullion-coins-and-bars/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
VA2F-KYYP] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
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C. The Fiat Money Thought Experiment, Part 3: From Fiat
Paper Notes to Fiat Electricity (Digital Currency)
Imagine that the sovereign, perhaps a bit unscrupulous and em-
boldened by past successes in iterative rounds of fiat money issuance
and legal seigniorage (debasement deltas), decides it is time to repeat
history with yet another new form of fiat currency. Say there have
been two major technical breakthroughs since paper-and-ink became
the currency: electricity and computing. In this world, it has become
possible to store and send information, including financial transac-
tional information, at light speed worldwide. Recently, electronic ledg-
ers called blockchains have become available that theoretically allow
for transparent tracking, auditing, and recording of any commercial
transaction.132
Some people, urged on by self-held principles of liberty, decided to
create a digital asset using blockchains and computing power. This is
not a fiat currency. And the digital asset is decidedly not barter. In the
sovereign’s eyes, the digital asset’s widespread adoption may be seen
as either: (1) a private end-route run around the less technologically
advanced fiat paper-and-ink currency to avoid debasement deltas and
perhaps also taxes;133 or (2) a market signal that the sovereign needs
to consider “updating” its own fiat currency.134
There would always be a case of adjustment in establishing new
exchange values for any new product that comes to the market. But
this digital asset is different in that the new “product” is being used as
an intermediate, universal good for all other goods in the market. It is,
in effect, a new private money competing with the fiat currency. What
the private digital asset lacks—and what the fiat currency has—is the
force of law behind it.
And the force of law will act swiftly to deter this private money,
just as happened to raw silver in the beginning of our story. Indeed,
132. See Michel Rauchs et al., Distributed Ledger Technology Systems: A Conceptual
Framework, CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALTERNATIVE FIN. (2018) (establishing concep-
tual framework for blockchain/DLT technology).
133. Kevin Costelloe, Bitcoin ‘Ought to Be Outlawed,’ Nobel Prize Winner Stiglitz
Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-11-29/bitcoin-ought-to-be-outlawed-nobel-prize-winner-stiglitz-says-jal10
hxd [https://perma.unl.edu/5822-Y8UK].
134. Christine Lagarde, Winds of Change: The Case for New Digital Currency, Speech
at Singapore Fintech Festival (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Arti-
cles/2018/11/13/sp111418-winds-of-change-the-case-for-new-digital-currency
[https://perma.unl.edu/J2SF-DDAC] (advocating adoption of digital currency by
governments). See also Kenneth Rogoff, Cryptocurrencies Are Like Lottery Tickets
that Might Pay Off in the Future, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www
.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/10/cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-kenneth-rogoff
[https://perma.unl.edu/U9N2-LJC3] (“[W]hen it comes to new forms of money, the
private sector may innovate, but in due time the government regulates and
appropriates.”).
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the sovereign’s tax collectors are likely to take immediate issue with
the merchants who have begun to transact in this fashion, asking how
holders of the digital money expect to pay tax in the functional paper-
and-ink currency units expected of them as they acquire the digital
asset.135
Simultaneously, the sovereign may seize the digital money from
some holders and refuse to offer legal support to those who are de-
frauded in their exchanges for the money because it is not legal
tender. In other words, the laws of legal tender, functional currency,
and non-fiat money bans will rear their heads to quash this breakout
attempt for privatized currency using a new technology not exclu-
sively owned by the sovereign.
The sovereign can quash the digital money, but as the saying goes,
imitation is the most sincere form of flattery. The sovereign may in-
stead create its own digital currency (call it “Phoenix”136), declaring it
the new fiat currency that rises from the ashes of the dying paper-and-
ink currency.137
There may be public advantages over fiat paper-and-ink for a fiat
digital currency. For example, organized crime uses the anonymity of
paper-and-ink to achieve nefarious goals.138 No doubt the sovereign
will point out such benefits in an effort to persuade citizens not to
resist the issuance of the new currency. But the issuance of the new
Phoenix currency also offers a nefarious opportunity to the sovereign,
if the sovereign so chooses, to exact another round of legal seigniorage
(a debasement delta). And, just as was the case for fiat silver and fiat
paper-and-ink currencies before it, the Phoenix promises to those
merchants who supply the necessary ingredients to fashion a Phoe-
nix—namely algorithms, computing power, information technology,
and electricity, as well as those with already existing significant
wealth—a monetary proximity to the issuance of the Phoenix such
that they will receive it before other members of society, and in turn,
exact their own rounds of debasement deltas on later recipients of the
135. See IRS Notice, 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (“In general, the sale or exchange of
convertible virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for
goods or services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax consequences that
may result in a tax liability.”).
136. ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LIMITED, Get Ready for the Phoenix, 306 ECONOMIST 9
(January 1, 1988) (predicting that by 2018, a new international currency would
develop).
137. Richard Senner & Didier Sornette, The Holy Grail of Crypto Currencies: Ready to
Replace Fiat Money?, J. ECON. ISSUES (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that crypto
currencies lack stability that fiat paper money offers “because [monetary] quan-
tity adjustments are not a sufficient condition for stable prices . . . [Instead] coor-
dinated wage bargaining appears vital to achieve price stability . . . wages have to
grow in line with productivity plus the inflation target.”).
138. See KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (2016).
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currency.139 True to precedent, a new segment of fiat poor will form
and the environment will be further damaged.140
In this tale of three successive issuances of fiat currency (fiat sil-
ver, then fiat paper-and-ink, and then fiat electricity/digital currency),
there is a silver lining: if the sovereign does not issue the fiat currency
with a debasement delta, and if the sovereign distributes the new cur-
rency simultaneously to all members of society in exchange for their
past fiat currencies, the harmful consequences of debasement deltas
are resolved. That is, if the marginal cost of the production of the digi-
tal currency is all that the government seeks to recoup in issuing it,
then there may be some economic and environmental stability to the
digital currency.141 However, the attendant laws that coerce its usage
may nevertheless lead to what historically has proven to be nearly un-
remitting temptation for a sovereign to implicitly tax a population
through issuance of each new fiat currency.
D. The Globalization of Fiat: Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
For the longest period of human civilization, gold and silver served
as the most widespread forms of money. These precious metals do not
have national character, but rather international character. The met-
als have flowed freely in trade from region to region, from people to
people, and from nation to nation. Simultaneously, silver and gold as
money retain a private and individualistic aspect outside of the con-
trol of governments that is desirable to the many in society who view
centralization and government fiat control of all aspects of money as
problematic, for reasons outlined in this Article and beyond.142 For
these reasons, silver and gold have a character that appeals both to
139. See SELIGMAN, supra note 102. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Macro-economic Man-
agement in an Electronic Credit/Financial System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res,
Working Paper No. 23032, 2017) (proposing credit auctions during the issuance of
digital currency). Stiglitz reveals the sovereign favoritism and path dependency
that issuance of digital currency would permit as follows:
The government may still want to delegate responsibility for making
credit decisions to private enterprises. Credit auctions provide one way
of doing so, while simultaneously addressing the . . . making [of] it more
likely that the government captures a larger share of the rents associated
with the value of its credibility and guarantees) and providing for greater
economic stability.
The basic idea is straightforward: the central bank (government) auc-
tions off the rights to issue new credit.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
140. See generally id.
141. See Adam Hayes, Bitcoin Price and its Marginal Cost of Production: Supporting
Evidence, 5 APP. ECON. LETTERS 1, 1 (2018).
142. See O.K.F., Gold Clauses. Private International Law., 1 MOD. L. REV. 158, 159
(1937) (“Every decision upholding a gold clause works, therefore, in two direc-
tions: it helps maintain an ‘international’ element in a world of ‘nationalized’ eco-
nomics, and it assists individual parties in putting their relationship above and
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“globalists” (those who favor central global sovereign authority) and to
“individualists” or “nationalists” (those who disdain globalism).
The twentieth century abandoned the gold and silver standards in
favor of fiat paper. Thus, during the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries to date, paper money has, by and large, had national character.
True, there have been twentieth century international compacts re-
garding money, and many currencies have tethered to the dollar in
particular, but sovereigns have traditionally been national sovereigns,
and their monies traditionally national monies. The international
character of money found in gold and silver was lost in the shift to fiat
paper.
Concurrent with the growing chorus of voices for a shift from paper
currency to digital currency143 is a subtle but significant demand by
globalists to restore the international character of money rather than
relying on the U.S. dollar—one nation’s currency—as a de facto “world
reserve” currency. Indeed, just as gold and silver offered international
trade benefits and more throughout history, so too do globalists be-
lieve that a world currency should not be an overextended national-
currency-turned-international-money like the dollar, but rather a true
international money.
And yet, what is curious is that globalists, by and large, do not
advocate a return to gold and silver standards, which offer such an
international monetary character. But if not gold or silver, then what
can an international money be? The concept for this international cur-
rency was outlined in a front cover editorial by The Economist maga-
zine in 1988, when the staff projected the idea of an international fiat
currency:
Thirty years from now, Americans, Japanese, Europeans, and people in many
other rich countries, and some relatively poor ones will probably be paying for
their shopping with the same currency. Prices will be quoted not in dollars,
yen or D-marks but in, let’s say, the phoenix. The phoenix will be favoured by
companies and shoppers because it will be more convenient than today’s na-
tional currencies, which by then will seem a quaint cause of much disruption
to economic life in the last twentieth century.
. . . .
The phoenix zone would impose tight constraints on national governments.
There would be no such thing, for instance, as a national monetary policy. The
world phoenix supply would be fixed by a new central bank, descended per-
haps from the IMF. The world inflation rate—and hence, within narrow mar-
gins, each national inflation rate—would be in its charge. Each country could
use taxes and public spending to offset temporary falls in demand, but it
would have to borrow rather than print money to finance its budget deficit.
. . . .
This means a big loss of economic sovereignty, but the trends that make
the phoenix so appealing are taking that sovereignty away in any case. Even
outside ‘planning’ on the part of government authorities. The gold clause has an
international and, at the same time, an individualistic aspect.”).
143. See supra section II.C.
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in a world of more-or-less floating exchange rates, individual governments
have seen their policy independence checked by an unfriendly outside world.
. . . .
As the next century approaches, the natural forces that are pushing the
world towards economic integration will offer governments a broad choice.
They can go with the flow, or they can build barricades. Preparing the way for
the phoenix will mean fewer pretended agreements on policy and more real
ones. It will mean allowing and then actively promoting the private-sector use
of an international money alongside existing national monies. That would let
people vote with their wallets for the eventual move to full currency union.
The phoenix would probably start as a cocktail of national currencies, just as
the [International Monetary Fund’s] Special Drawing Right is today. In time,
though, its value against national currencies would cease to matter, because
people would choose it for its convenience and the stability of its purchasing
power. . . . Pencil in the phoenix for around 2018, and welcome it when it
comes.144
There is an implicit assumption about sovereignty in this Econo-
mist call for an international fiat currency: that monetary sovereignty
is ultimately and properly international, not national. Globalists typi-
cally have some sense that there should be a global monetary sover-
eignty vested in a select group of rulers who personally transcend
national identities. How these rulers would come to have such mone-
tary power—and whether the citizens of the nation-states that cur-
rently exist have any representative voice in selecting such rulers—is
not altogether clear or settled.145
The other key point to observe from such a proposal is that the
“Phoenix” was envisioned as a fiat currency. Thus, the global sover-
eigns—whoever they may be and however they become such—are in
largely the same position as national sovereigns with respect to cur-
rency: capable of passing attendant laws that ensure the possibility of
a debasement delta, resulting in impoverishment of many and further
144. Get Ready for the Phoenix, supra note 136, at 9–10.
145. As noted in section III.A discussing a hypothetical sovereign, “[h]ow that sover-
eign is selected, and the legitimacy of that sovereign, are important philosophical
considerations for monetary theory, but those questions are left unaddressed for
this Article’s purposes.” Supra note 92. See also JUVENAL, Satire VI, lines 347–48,
SATIRES (1960) (“Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?”). An interesting South Dakota
Supreme Court case may offer persuasive authority regarding the issue of
whether self-appointed sovereigns—either domestic or international but point-
edly without U.S. or state government affiliation—may create and issue their
own “credit.” State v. Dale, 439 N.W.2d 98, 100–04 (S.D. 1989). Dale, self-ap-
pointed, issued his own printed form of “credit” (unrecognized by banks and the
South Dakota State Banking Commission) and used the credit to purchase items.
When the payees realized that the credit documents were not actual checks, Dale
(and his collaborators) were arrested and charged with theft. Dale argued that
his credit was valid because the U.S. monetary system was based on illegal fiat
money, entitling him to issue his own credit. The trial court and South Dakota
Supreme Court ruled Dale’s proffered evidence about the U.S. financial system
was irrelevant and precluded it from trial. Id. at 103. Dale was convicted (and the
conviction was affirmed on appeal) of grand theft by deception. Id. at 111.
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environmental damage.146 Only in this case, effects would be truly
global, not nationally restricted.
The Special Drawing Right (SDR) referenced in the Economist arti-
cle is a monetary unit of credit of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), one of two “central bank of central banks.” (The other “central
bank of central banks” is the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS).) The SDR is a monetary instrument that, as the Economist ob-
served, is a “cocktail of national currencies.”147 What the SDR actu-
ally “is” is disputed. Officially it is described as an interest-bearing
“international reserve asset,”148 but it already is accepted by the U.S.
Treasury in payment of debts.149 And the SDR could, as the Econo-
mist article noted, become the credit basis of a globalist sovereign’s
fiat money. Much as national sovereigns can create fiat paper credit
(bills) at their pleasure, so too could the global sovereign create SDRs
(or an equivalent credit-money).
Indeed, Christine Lagarde, the current IMF Director, in a recent
speech endorsed the idea that governments should adopt fiat digital
currency in the near future.150 It is not a far cry to anticipate that the
IMF or BIS or both may at some point soon advocate a digital fiat
global currency, issued at the pleasure and credit of global monetary
sovereigns (whomever they may be), to replace both the dollar as a
global reserve currency and, in turn, most or all national currencies.
The merits of a one world global digital currency can be debated.
One thing is sure: if that one world currency is fiat and has attendant
laws like legal tender, non-fiat money bans, and a functional currency
mandate, then it runs the same risks of creating widespread poverty
and destroying the environment as the dollar has. That the sovereign
is global rather than national does not make things better. Indeed, the
greater degree of centralization might make things worse.151
146. It is therefore little wonder that individualists who admire gold and silver, de-
spite their international character, might despise a globalist fiat currency that
likewise has international character, because it centralizes monetary authority
and allows for potential economic gains of that central authority and those with
privileged access to it.
147. See Get Ready for the Phoenix, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. INT’L MONETARY FUND, Special Drawing Right (SDR), IMF Factsheet (Apr. 19,
2018), https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-
Drawing-Right-SDR [https://perma.unl.edu/V39Q-D9KH].
149. 12 U.S.C. § 467 (2018) (“The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed
to receive deposits of . . . Special Drawing Right certificates with the Treasurer or
any designated depositary of the United States when tendered by any Federal
Reserve bank or Federal Reserve agent for credit to its or his account with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.”).
150. See Costelloe, supra note 133.
151. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (warning against tyranny
and economic disaster prompted by central economic planning).
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IV. CONCLUSION: SOLUTIONS FOR REFORM
The dollar, as currently construed or as may be construed as a digi-
tal currency in the near future, assumes the approach of a top-down
controlled invention of a sovereign government. Modern monetary pol-
icy does not start by assumption that any two products have a “true”
valuation, but rather that there is no inherent value of the dollar rela-
tive to any other product. To the modern economist, relative values
are entirely subjective and in the eyes of the beholder. This stands in
stark contrast to ancient historical accounts of money, where, at a
minimum, God defined humans and their labor’s value by exact, un-
changing weight in silver, as he did for essential products that
humans created or harvested (e.g. food, namely fish and bread).152
As both a normative and factual inquiry, history proves more faith-
fully correct than the present, purely subjectivist conception of an en-
tirely sovereign-controlled value undergirding the dollar. The
normative reason is that the subjectivist approach, taken to its logical
end under a regime of fiat money with its attendant laws of legal
tender, non-fiat money bans, and functional currency mandates, com-
mutes the infinite values of human life and a healthy environment to
just another two of countless things in the marketplace. This has
things upside-down. Human life and the environment are indispensa-
ble to the marketplace. If they are intentionally sacrificed to promote
the selling and buying of other things, then the marketplace has be-
come an ethical sham. Moreover, the dollar will have become an un-
sustainable factual sham because without an environment and a
robust supply of human trading partners, there is no market to be had
in the long run.153
The problem America now faces is that, at least since 1857, the
government moved away from the universal silver standard that
stretched back to time immemorial. And since 1971 when Nixon
moved the United States off of the gold standard, the government uses
only fiat money, sustained only by trust that the U.S. government will
continue to function. Multiple rounds of debasement deltas have been
exacted over these 161 years. Indeed, as we showed in the previous
section, a debasement delta of over 0.98 exists presently in comparing
fiat silver and fiat paper-and-ink. Americans’ wealth has been steadily
devalued by its government via fiat currency.154
Prominent academics in recent monetary conferences have claimed
that silver and gold have been “surpassed” as trite, ancient forms of
152. See Exodus 30:12–13; Leviticus 27:1–8; Matthew 17:24–27.
153. See Guzelian, supra note 76.
154. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 462–63 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (“Money
is not only a medium of exchange, but it is a standard of value. Nothing can be
such standard which has not intrinsic value, or which is subject to frequent
changes in value.”).
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money. These academics claim that the precious metals have no effec-
tive monetary place in a modern society where the velocity of money is
required to be much faster and higher than exchange of physical items
“permits.” In other words, just as religious fervor for God has waned in
the United States in the past 161 years,155 so too, claim these academ-
ics, has the public’s appetite for His divine currencies. Instead, a more
“bourgeois” modern American population prefers paper bills, or better
yet, mobile phone digital payments.156 Silver and gold are relics of
bygone, simpler economic times.
On the surface, these academic claims sound appealing to Ameri-
cans wed to paying for Starbucks by waving their smart phones in
front of a scanner. But as this Article has shown, the adverse conse-
quences for the environment and for the poor are immeasurable—and
many more have become poor as a result of fiat money and its laws.
Those costs are hidden from our day-to-day functioning, but the effects
are real. It is also ironic that governments, no doubt quick to dismiss
the populace’s return to gold and silver usage over existing fiat cur-
rencies, are among the greatest hoarders of gold and silver on
earth.157
It is in this context that I present a cosmic challenge to worldwide
governments. If fiat money and fiat digital currencies are truly such a
great invention, and if the populace and environment on the whole
benefit from them, then let the markets decide that rather than the
legal system. Deregulate fiat and digital money.158 By this, I mean
governments—starting with the U.S. government—should amend
monetary laws according to the following proposals for legal reform of
the U.S. dollar: (1) Repeal and forbid all legal tender laws; (2) Repeal
and forbid all non-fiat money bans, except those regulating counter-
feiting and fraud; (3) Declare gold and silver in bar or coin form as
functional currencies for U.S. tax and tariff purposes; and (4) Declare
any asset held by more than 66% of the American adult population
and recognized by them as a form of money as a functional currency
until that asset’s circulation declines beneath the 66% threshold.
155. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DI-
VIDES US AND UNITES US (2012) (finding a general increase in non-religious peo-
ple in the U.S. population).
156. See Shann Turnbull, How Might Cell Phone Money Change the Financial Sys-
tem?, 30 J. FIN. TRANS. 33, 34 (2010) (contending that cloud banking and mass
cell phone usage requires a rethinking about the nature of legal tender money).
157. STATISTICA, Gold Reserves of Largest Gold Holding Countries Worldwide as of De-
cember 2018 (in metric tons) (December 2018), https://www.statista.com/statis
tics/267998/countries-with-the-largest-gold-reserves/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
VB6S-NWW4].
158. As dissenting Justice Field said in the last of the legal tender cases, “[s]o it al-
ways will be; legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the
equivalent of the thing itself.” Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 452.
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Proposals for legal reform of the U.S. Dollar
1) Repeal and forbid all legal tender laws.
2) Repeal and forbid all non-fiat money bans, except those regu-
lating counterfeiting and fraud.
3) Declare gold and silver in bar or coin form as functional cur-
rencies for U.S. tax and tariff purposes.
4) Declare any asset held by more than 66% of the American
adult population and recognized by them as a form of money
as a functional currency until that asset’s circulation declines
beneath the 66% threshold.
Observe how these four reforms, working together, may restore
wealth to the poor and improve the environment—the two major
harms of fiat money upheld by force of law. All of these reforms are
legal reforms. They do not prohibit the issuance of fiat money by a
government. What these reforms do is prohibit the government from
coercing use of the fiat money to the detriment of spontaneously
evolved or divinely given monies.
By removing legal tender laws, no more can a debtor compel a
debtor to accept fiat currency in place of an agreed-upon exchange
value.159 By prohibiting non-fiat money bans apart from counterfeit-
ing or fraudulent specie laws, never again can the government seize
gold (or silver or other precious monetary assets) in exchange for de-
valued fiat currency.
Perhaps most importantly, the government should compel the
I.R.S. and other taxing authorities to accept gold and silver, or any
other item that is widely recognized as money by the American popu-
lation as functional currency (for example, a currency held by at least
66% of the population and is therefore not just a passing fad). This
provision is essential in breaking the compulsion to hold fiat money,
as one could always pay in gold and silver, or any financial asset—
foreseen or unforeseen—that spontaneously evolves in the market-
place as a form of money rather than by design of the sovereign.160
Rather than the marketplace bending to the fiat will of the sovereign,
159. Cf. Lawrence H. White, Banking Without a Central Bank: Scotland Before 1844
as a ‘Free Banking’ System, in UNREGULATED BANKING: CHAOS OR ORDER? 37–62
(F. Capie and G. E. Wood (eds.)) (1990) (discussing the successes of Scotland’s
economy in the absence of legal tender requirements).
160. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT REFINED
(1978) (contending that dominant forms of private money will emerge in the mar-
ketplace as a form of spontaneous order). See also VERA C. SMITH, THE RATIONALE
OF CENTRAL BANKING AND THE FREE BANKING ALTERNATIVE (1936) (evaluating rel-
ative strengths and weaknesses of central and free banking).
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the sovereign tax collector bends to the evolutionary monetary innova-
tions of the market.
Fiat money may still have a place in this world. But after these
four reforms, it will not have a legal stranglehold on the world. It will
have to compete on the merits without its usual legal seigniorage and
debasement deltas awarded to the sovereign and those close to the
sovereign. Moreover, by eradicating the legally enforceable opportuni-
ties for debasement deltas, the phenomenon of crushing financial bur-
dens for the poor and harms to the environment will be lessened.
One final problem exists that must be addressed in extricating our-
selves from the present fiat situation we find ourselves in in the
United States: the existing wealth disparity that has been produced
through the longstanding practice of fiat money issuance. Since the
financial crisis of 2008, many private citizens have recognized that
government fiat money has questionable implications, and have
stacked physical gold and silver outside of the financial system in the
event of further financial crisis in unprecedented amounts.161 Thus,
there has been marketplace preparation to “decouple” from a greatly
devalued fiat dollar whose continued solvency is now steadily being
called into question.162
Some economists have fashioned proposals for how to move back to
a gold or silver standard from the present pure fiat standard.163 This
Article takes a different approach—a legal approach. By deregulating
the fiat dollar by stripping it of most of its attendant legal powers, the
161. See JM BULLION, Who Owns the Most Silver Bullion Today?, (2017) https://www
.jmbullion.com/investing-guide/pricing-payments/who-owns-most-silver-bullion-
today/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ZW2F-P4D9].
162. Ron Paul, The Dollar Dilemma: Where to From Here?, MISES WIRE (June 22,
2018) (outlining ongoing problems and opportunities related to stark devaluation
of the fiat dollar, and emphasizing possible international abandonment of the dol-
lar standard).
163. See JESU´S HUERTA DE SOTO, MONEY, BANK CREDIT, AND ECONOMIC CYCLES
715–803 (Melinda A. Stroup, trans., 3d ed. 2012) (reviewing others’ proposals and
offering a novel proposal for return to the gold standard); Judy Shelton, How a
Gold-Backed Bond Could Open an Avenue To Monetary Reform, THE SUN (Sept.
5, 2015) (advocating issuance of a U.S. government debt security that protects
against dollar debasement relative to gold); Joseph T. Salerno, The Gold Stan-
dard: An Analysis of Some Recent Proposals, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS (1982)
(evaluating various methods by which the gold standard could be restored). But
see FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM at 42 (“My conclusion is that an auto-
matic commodity standard is neither a feasible nor a desirable solution to the
problem of establishing monetary arrangements for a free society. It is not desira-
ble because it would involve a large cost in the form of resources used to produce
the monetary commodity. It is not feasible because the mythology and beliefs re-
quired to make it effective do not exist.”); Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold
Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary
Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 532 (1983) (“The case for a gold standard is most
appealing when inflation is rampant but, paradoxically, rapid inflation makes a
gold standard impracticable.”).
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demand for fiat money should decline (if not collapse because the dol-
lar is, in modern form, already greatly devalued). But fiat dollars are
debt instruments of the sovereign; they are a promise by the sovereign
to pay back a “debt owed.” But pay back in what?
Silver and gold are held in overwhelming concentrations by banks,
a bourgeois financial class, and governments. Thus, if America were to
suddenly remove the laws undergirding fiat dollars, people have the
legal freedom to use alternate currencies—and specifically gold and
silver may be likely to resurface in common usage. But there would be
a massive imbalance in exchange values between the relatively worth-
less fiat money (held by the public) and the suddenly relatively more
valuable precious metals (held predominantly by governments, cen-
tral and major banks, and funds closest to them). Said differently, the
monopoly control that governments, banks, and the bourgeois class
have over gold and silver mean that the grossly imbalanced financial
hierarchy of wealth brought about by the issuance of fiat money is
unlikely to change if monopolists could charge virtually whatever
price they wish in fiat money to sell their reserves of gold and silver.
Indeed, bank manipulation of market prices for gold and silver seems
to be ongoing even now.164
One possible way to correct for the wealth imbalance and income
inequality brought on by fiat money is to legally institute reparations.
Admittedly, it is dizzyingly complex to track who over the centuries
has benefitted and who has lost because of fiat dollars and their at-
tendant laws. But the general principle could be to effect a general
transfer of some of the silver and gold from the government and signif-
icant holders of them to the poor at a favorable rate in exchange for
their relatively worthless fiat money. Indeed, mechanisms for govern-
ment reparations already have been proposed for effects of slavery and
racial discrimination165 and for environmental damages.166 And after
the Nazis confiscated Hungarian Jewish gold during the Second
World War, the United States was recently compelled to restitute the
164. See Wacker v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 678 Fed. Appx. 27 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding
that commodity traders’ lawsuit against major bank holder of silver plausibly
gives rise to inference of monopolization and anticompetitive conduct by the
bank). See Dawn Giel, JP Morgan Faces Potential Class Action Lawsuit After
Guilty Pleas by a Former Metals Trader, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc
.com/2018/12/13/jp-morgan-faces-lawsuits-after-guilty-pleas-by-a-former-metals-
trader.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9QD7-T7T8].
165. See Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811 (2006) (review-
ing history of U.S. government reparations and arguing for a broader conception
of the relationship between wrongdoer and payer, and injured and recipient in
establishing such legislative reparations).
166. See Catherine Millas Kaiman, Environmental Justice and Community-Based
Reparations, 39 SEATTLE L. REV. 1328 (2016) (arguing for community-led repara-
tions and sustainable development after environmental degradation by
outsiders).
2019] THE DOLLAR’S DEADLY LAWS 107
kin and descendants of those who lost their physical wealth due to
U.S. Army soldiers’ plundering of the German loot.167
The idea would be for the oligopolistic holders of silver and the
(predominantly) government holders of gold168 to create a legislative
peg of the rates of gold and silver to modern fiat dollars at the 15:1
(silver to gold) and 20:1 (gold to fiat dollar) rates established prior to
the 1930s confiscation of gold. This would be permitted for anyone be-
low some wealth and income level. While this would certainly lead to
market arbitraging, such an action would also empower the poor to
exchange fiat money for precious metals at a rate below current mar-
ket price and lead to a redistributive offset of some of the longstanding
inflation effects that holding fiat dollars have had on extremely poor
fiat poor (and possibly their forbears).169
An alternative to reparations could be a “debt jubilee,” in which
governments and major holders of wealth forgive debts of those below
a certain income and wealth level without any coerced change in the
relative social distributions of precious metals. This is in effect a “re-
set” where the poor do not gain immediate access to silver and gold
stashes in place of their fiat money, but at the same time are free from
debt obligations in a fashion that permits them to work freely towards
their own gains using whatever currency they choose. A debt jubilee
has both biblical and modern precedent, albeit not in the amounts nec-
essary to have significant consequence for the poor.170
There is no quick answer to overcoming the past and ongoing ine-
quality created by fiat money. Further discussion and research are re-
quired. What this preliminary Article has sought to do is to articulate
why the U.S. dollar’s current legal status harms the poor and damages
167. Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (ruling on this
matter). See also Charles Tiefer, Jonathan Cuneo & Annie Reiner, Could This
Train Make It Through: The Law and Strategy of the Gold Train Case, 15 YALE
HUM. RIGHTS AND DEV. L.J. 129 (2013) (relating story of the Rosner case in which
the U.S. government paid reparations for plundering of Hungarian Jewish gold
stored in a Nazi train during the Second World War).
168. This is Who Owns Most of the World’s Gold, MSN MONEY (Jan. 12, 2018), https://
www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/this-is-who-owns-most-of-the-worlds-gold/
ss-BBGmtjN [https://perma.unl.edu/2CW7-9C44].
169. See Webster, supra note 6 (“The precious metals alone . . . are money, and
whatever else is to perform the functions of money must be their representative,
and capable of being turned into them at will. So long as bank paper retains this
quality it is a substitute for money; divested of this, nothing can give it that
character.”).
170. See generally Leviticus 25, 27 (stating requirements for the 50-year debt Jubilee
for ancient Israelites). In the 2000s, Live 8 concert series led by U2 bandleader
Bono promoted a world debt jubilee that led to the cancelation of $116 billion in
the debts of poor nations. Cf. Adam Forrest, Did Live 8 Work? 10 Years On, the
Debt Burden Returns, FORBES (July 13, 2015) (noting a decennial recurrence of
debt among countries that received debt forgiveness as a consequence of the Live
8 series).
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the environment. The Article also contends that the solution to these
two damning harms lies not in improving monetary or banking theory
or data analytics to make a better fiat currency. Rather, the solution is
one of legal reforms.
It is the province of lawyers, not bankers or economists, to amend
the legal supports that prop up the dollar in a form that has caused
considerable harms for a century and a half. It is due time that these
legal amendments occur. Otherwise, left to its fiat inertia and signifi-
cant devaluation over the years, the fiat dollar—like other deceased
fiat currencies before it—may give way to a centralized global cur-
rency whose legal powers will be similar to those of the dollar and
whose global reach may only heighten the poverty and environmental
destruction this Article addresses.
